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ARTICLES




Beyond being an environmental concern, pollution is a public health problem. As a
result, enforcement of anti-pollution statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act, not only protects the environment, but also furthers fundamental public
health goals. Moreover, public health benefits provide politically salient arguments for
continuing and even strengthening environmental protection that can counteract any
political opposition that can arise as a result of the costs of environmental regulation
and compliance to regulated entities and the taxpayers.
Thus, it is worth examining the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) considers the public health in its environmental enforcement priorities and
decisions. Focusing on the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, this Article
undertakes such an examination by: (1) outlining the statutory connections between
public health considerations and environmental regulation; (2) examining the EPA’s
enforcement priorities and guidance; and (3) criticizing the EPA’s presentation of its
own enforcement effectiveness over the last decade.
This Article concludes that public health considerations do play a significant role in
environmental enforcement policies and decisionmaking. However, the EPA’s
commitment to presenting the public health benefits of its enforcement actions has varied
considerably over the last decade. With the release of its FY2009 enforcement
assessment, however, the EPA has both expanded its analysis of the connection between
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environmental pollution enforcement and public health benefits and created new tools
to enhance the transparency of these benefits to the affected public.
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1. Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”: Pollution Regulation,
Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 152–54 (Oct.
2007). See also generally Wendy Wagner & Lynn Blais, Children’s Health and Environmental Exposure
Risks: Information Gaps, Scientific Uncertainty, and Regulatory Reform, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
249 (Spring 2007); Jessica E. Yates, Note, Pollution and Health Care Costs: States Can and Should Seek
Medicaid Reimbursement from Big Polluters, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423 (2006); Todd Stedeford et al.,
Environmental Quality and Health: Got Merc? Regulating, Mitigating, and Litigating Mercury Levels for
the Fish We Eat, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 503 (Spring 2005).
2. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, REBUILDING THE UNITY OF HEALTH AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: THE GREATER HOUSTON METROPOLITAN AREA: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 8 (2005)
[hereinafter 2005 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE WORKSHOP].
3. Craig, supra note 1, at 153–54 (citations omitted).
4. 2005 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 8.
5. NAAQS are technology-based emission standards that govern emissions of common and
widespread “criteria pollutants,” such as sulfur and particulate matter, that “cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006). Primary NAAQS are the standards “requisite to protect the public health.” Id.
§ 7409(b)(1).
6. 42. U.S.C. § 7412(b0(1), (d)(2) (2006). NESHAPs are technology-based standards that control
the emission of 189 toxic air pollutants to the “maximum degree of reduction in emissions . . . (including
a prohibition on such emissions, where achievable) . . . .” Id. § 7412(d)(2).
INTRODUCTION
As I have noted elsewhere, “Pollution kills. It also debilitates, sickens,
and poisons. In other words, pollution is a public health problem—one of the
prominent reasons that the federal and state governments regulate pollution
pursuant to a wide variety of environmental laws and regulations.”  Indeed,1
the National Institutes of Medicine (NIM) have explained that pollution is a
significant element of “[e]nvironmental health or environmental public
health . . . [a] component of human health . . . concerned with those aspects of
human health that are determined by interactions with physical, chemical,
biological, cultural, and social factors in the environment.”  Among public2
health officials, environmental health is becoming the next focus of public
health improvement in the United States.3
As the NIM further acknowledges, one facet of advancing environmental
health is the recognition that humans have altered their environments. As a
result, controlling environmental degradation—such as through pollution
regulation—is an important component of current and future public health.4
Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has acknowledged
the public health import of environmental pollution by basing regulatory
standards—such as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),5
the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs),6
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7. Under the federal Clean Water Act, an “effluent limitation” is “any restriction . . . on quantities,
rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged
from point sources” into regulated waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2006). Toxic pollutants are subject to one
of the Act’s most stringent sets of effluent limitations, based on “the best available technology economically
achievable . . . .” Id. § 1311(2)(A).
8. 2005 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 155–56, 158–69.
9. In this context, a precautionary principle would have two main applications: a prohibition on
activities that might harm human health until they are proven safe; and a requirement that regulators protect
human health even in the absence of perfect information. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the
Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 495 (noting that the precautionary principle is “a
fundamental principle of environmental law”), 498–504 (defining and outlining the uses of the principle)
(Mar. 2008); Hope M. Babcock, Chumming on the Chesapeake Bay and Complexity Theory: Why the
Precautionary Principle, Not Cost-Benefit Analysis, Makes More Sense as a Regulatory Approach, 82
WASH. L. REV. 505, 524–31 (Aug. 2007) (advocating the use of the precautionary principle for complex
marine systems in light of a lack of adequate information to predict how such systems behave).
10. See, e.g., Kurt A. Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention and Environmental
Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–3 (Fall 1997) (discussing the distinction between technology-
based pollution control and the more desirable goal of pollution prevention).
and effluent standards for toxic water pollutants —on human health7
requirements.8
Given these health-related regulatory standards, enforcement of the
federal pollution control statutes is an important facet of public health
protection. However, environmental enforcement is an inherently
discretionary activity. Therefore, an interesting question for both public health
officials and environmental practitioners is to what extent environmental
agencies consciously and explicitly seek to advance the pollution control
statutes’ public health-related goals.
Of course, implementing environmental health goals can become
problematic long before the enforcement stage. Setting health-based
regulatory standards requires sufficient information about the health effects
of particular pollutants to perform a proper risk assessment, and the lack of
such information may lead either to inaction in the face of uncertainty or to
application of default policies such as some version of a precautionary
principle.  Even when sufficient information regarding causation and risk9
exists, limitations in the technology available to control releases of pollution
may force choices between implementing the “first best” regulatory standard
from a public health perspective and avoiding dislocation or closure of
economically important industries.  Conversely, the quest for the “perfect”10
standard can sometimes obscure significant public health benefits from
improved-but-less-than-perfect environmental conditions: the fact that air
quality in Los Angeles and Houston regularly violates the Clean Air Act’s
ambient air quality requirements should not detract from the fact that air
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11. For example, United States cities barely made a 2008 list of the world’s dirtiest cities, while
Mexico City made the list at number 5. Tiffany M. Luck, The World’s Dirtiest Cities, FORBES.COM
(Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/26/pollution-baku-oil-biz-logistics-cx_tl_0226dirty
cities.html.
12. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943–47 (May 1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 1983–86 (May 1998).
13. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1535-37 (Fall 1996).
14. See generally, e.g., PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999) (discussing both generally
and specifically the use of the precautionary principle in environmental law and policy).
15. As is discussed in Part I, for example, the Clean Air Act pursues emphatically health-based
national goals, while the Clean Water Act allows considerably more variation between locations regarding
the ultimate water quality goals to be achieved for particular waterbodies. See infra notes 29–84 and
accompanying text.
16. For example, two common variations in environmental analytical frameworks are: (1) whether
costs are relevant at all, and if so, to what degree, in setting regulatory standards; and (2) what level of risk
is deemed “acceptable” within a particular regulatory regime. As an example of the former, the U.S.
Supreme Court is currently deciding whether the EPA can engage in a cost-benefit analysis when
establishing standards for water intake facilities in new sources. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 475 F.3d
83 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1867 (2008). As an example of the second,
Congress and the EPA have repeatedly pursued more stringent regulation of carcinogens than of other kinds
of health-impairing pollutant. For example, the Delaney Clause of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act prohibits food additives from being deemed “safe” if they can cause cancer. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3).
17. See DADE W. MOELLER, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 1, 385–405 (3d ed. 2005) (surveying
standard-setting methodologies in U.S. environmental law and concluding that “[t]his review of U.S.
environmental standards clearly demonstrates the need to harmonize the methodologies for developing, and
the procedures for applying, occupations and environmental standards. This is true in terms of methods for
calculating doses to the public and estimating the associated risks, as well as for determining what levels
of risk are acceptable.”).
quality in both places is generally far better than that in Beijing or Mexico
City  and that U.S. residents’ health benefits accordingly.11
Nevertheless, the problems associated with establishing health-related
environmental regulatory standards are well-recognized, well-studied, and
well-theorized. Such issues include, for example, the proper uses of cost-
benefit analyses  and risk-risk balancing  when human lives are at stake and12 13
the definitions and roles of the precautionary principle in environmental
regulation.  If the resulting regulatory standards are not entirely consistent14
across statutory pollution control regimes regarding their abilities to protect
human health, at least the sources of those inconsistencies can be ascertained
from known variations in environmental policy,  analytical frameworks,  and15 16
analytical methodologies  among statutory regimes and agencies.17
In contrast, scholars and theorists have paid far less attention to the
incorporation of public health goals into enforcement decisions, even though
environmental enforcement involves the exercise of a great deal of agency
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18. See, e.g., Citizens Against Ruining the Environment v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 677–79 (7th Cir.
2008); New York Public Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 330–31 (2d Cir. 2003);
Citizens for a Better Environment-California v. Union Oil Co. of California, 82 F.3d 1111, 1119–20 (9th
Cir. 1996); Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 19 F.3d 1201, 1203–05 (7th Cir. 1994); Harmon Cove Condominium
Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. 1987) (all noting environmental agency enforcement or
prosecutorial discretion).
19. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, U.S. EPA, ANNUAL REPORT
ON ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1999, at 1 (July 2000) (stating,
in the section entitled “Our Mission: Protecting Human Health and the Environment,” that “[o]ur mission
is to protect the well-being of all Americans, our nation’s environment, and its natural resources.”)
[hereinafter 1999 ENFORCEMENT REPORT]. See also David Markell, Is There a Possible Roles for
Regulatory Enforcement in the Effort to Value, Protect, and Restore Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 549, 552–53 (Spring 2007) (discussing the importance of enforcement to the achievement of
environmental statutes’ goals and policies).
20. Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE’S SERVICES:
SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
21. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS
12–14, 49–63 (2005).
22. Compare, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, REBUILDING THE UNITY
discretion,  particularly in light of limited budgets and enforcement18
personnel. Agencies like the EPA simply cannot take equally stringent
enforcement actions against all violators of the federal pollution control
statutes. Complicating this enforcement discretion, moreover, is the fact that
few pollution control statutes have unitary goals. For example, the EPA
generally characterizes its overall mission in the binary form of “protecting
human health and the environment.”19
Of course, reducing pollution often protects human health and the
environment simultaneously; the two goals are not necessarily in conflict. For
example, as the study of ecosystem services—the services that intact and
functional ecosystems provide to humans, such as purification of air and
water —is increasingly documenting, protecting the environment can itself20
constitute a method of protecting human health.  Moreover, public health21
protection and environmental protection both provide public goods, the overall
improvement of quality of life and environmental amenities for the public as
a whole. While individuals will also benefit for pollution reduction, the
federal pollution control statutes do not tie pollution regulation to individual
tort-like harms.
Nevertheless, human health and environmental protection goals do not
always precisely overlap. For example, given the extensive built environment
and concentration of people in cities, pollution control in urban areas is more
likely to promote human health along with environmental protection; the
opposite may be true for rural enforcement efforts.  Thus, implementation of22
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OF HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE GREATER HOUSTON METROPOLITAN ARE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY
3 (2005) (describing water quality problems in Houston, Texas, in terms of keeping drinking water supplies
safe), with INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, REBUILDING THE UNITY OF HEALTH AND
THE ENVIRONMENT IN RURAL AMERICA: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 19 (2006) (describing water quality
problems in rural Iowa primarily in terms of fish kills).
environmental enforcement discretion could “tweak” the dual environmental
and public health goals of pollution regulation in any of several ways. Some
of the more prominent possibilities are: (1) no prioritization at all—i.e., the
agency pursues all violations equally vigorously; (2) enforcement against all
violations but prioritization in terms of level of enforcement (administrative,
civil, or criminal) pursued; (3) prioritization of the worst violations in terms
of statutory noncompliance for any enforcement effort whatsoever;
(4) prioritization of the worst violations in terms of actual or potential harm
to either the environment or public health for any enforcement effort
whatsoever; (5) prioritization of violations with environmental impacts for any
enforcement whatsoever; or (6) prioritization of violations with public health
impacts for any enforcement whatsoever.
Environmental agency enforcement policies thus can potentially affect the
balance between the environmental and the health aspects of pollution
regulation in two ways. First, rhetorically, such enforcement policies can
articulate (or not) the public health values of both environmental law itself and
the enforcement of that law. As such, enforcement policies can contribute to
public perceptions of how the public benefits from environmental law—in
terms of both environmental protection and public health protection—and
hence increase public awareness that these benefits do balance the private
burdens that environmental law imposes through permitting and emissions/
discharge/exposure/cleanup requirements. For example, if as a matter of
enforcement policy life-threatening environmental violations do not warrant
significant penalties, the public health values of environmental regulation have
been undermined.
Second, programmatically, enforcement policies dictate which public
values will be protected in the real world, under what circumstances they will
be protected, and to what degree. Therefore, in addition to reifying the values
rhetoric of these policies, enforcement also actualizes the degree of health
protection that the public will effectively enjoy as a result of pollution
regulation. At one extreme, for example, if the agency chooses to pursue
enforcement actions only when a violation of a pollution control law leads to
significant environmental damage, the public would likely be burdened with
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23. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. EPA, FY2007 OECA
ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 7–8 (May 22, 2008) (summarizing
enforcement efforts by statute), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/
accomplishments/oeca/fy07accomplishment.pdf [hereinafter 2007 ENFORCEMENT REPORT].
increased pollution-related health risks, regardless of the technical
requirements of the law.
This Article offers a qualitative look at the role of public health
considerations in the EPA’s pollution control enforcement decisions,
concentrating on the agency’s enforcement policies under the Clean Water Act
and the Clean Air Act (“the Acts”)—statutes that comprise two of the largest
subcategories of EPA enforcement actions —as they have guided23
enforcement over the last decade (1999–2009). Part I of this Article provides
a brief overview of each statute from a public health perspective, identifying
how public health considerations fit into each Act’s stated goals and
regulatory mechanisms and emphasizing that public health goals are indeed
a part of each Act. Part II looks more specifically at the enforcement options
available under each statute, assessing the statutory basis for a public health-
based enforcement preference. It concludes that, especially outside the
criminal enforcement context, the statutes provide little guidance to EPA and
state enforcement agencies regarding how to choose among administrative,
civil, and criminal enforcement, leaving these agencies with considerable
discretion in carrying out their enforcement programs.
In Part III, the Article takes an extensive look at EPA’s published
enforcement policies over the last decade. These policies include EPA’s
national enforcement priorities, various enforcement guidance documents for
each Act, and the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance’s
(OECA’s) annual reports on enforcement and compliance. The Article
concludes that while EPA enforcement policies are fairly equally targeted
toward both environmental and public health concerns, the enforcement focus
is somewhat skewed toward enforcement actions against violations that create
risks to the public health. EPA’s enforcement rhetoric, moreover, is often at
its strongest, most specific and most colorful when the EPA acts to protect the
public health, suggesting that the EPA recognizes the public relations value
of the public health aspects of environmental enforcement. Somewhat
perversely, therefore, OECA has recently muted its discussions of the public
health benefits of environmental enforcement outside of the Clean Air Act
context, creating an impression that only that Act significantly protects public
health.
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24. BARRY L. JOHNSON, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 187 (2007) (describing a
petition by London citizens in 1306 to King Edward to reduce the levels of smoke in the air).
25. To cause health problems, environmental contaminants have to penetrate at least one of three
barriers that protect the human body: the skin; the gastrointestinal tract; or the membranes within the lungs.
MOELLER, supra note 17, at 3.
Although an average adult ingests about 1.5 kilograms of food and 2 kilograms of water every day,
he or she breathes roughly 20 cubic meters of air per day. This amount of air weighs more than 24
kilograms. Because people usually cannot be selective about what air is available, the lungs are the
most important pathway for the intake of environmental contaminants into the body. The lungs are
also by far the most fragile and susceptible of the three principal barriers.
Id. at 4.
26. Famous examples of such fogs occurred in 1930 in Liège, Belgium, killing dozens of people,
id.; in 1948 in Donora, Pennsylvania, killing 20 and hospitalizing over 7,000 people in five days, id.; see
also JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 188 (2007) (describing the Donora disaster); and, most famously, in
London, England in 1952, killing anywhere from 4,000 to 11,000 people in four days. National Public
Radio, The Killer Fog of ’52, http://discover.npr.org/features/feature.jhtml?wfld=873954 (Dec. 11, 2002).
According to environmental historians, the 1952 London killer fog changed several countries’ attitudes
regarding the regulation of air pollution and helped to prompt pollution regulation in several countries,
including the United States. JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 187–88.
27. CAA § 101(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2006).
28. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955); Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (Dec. 31, 1970),
now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. See also JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 188 (characterizing the
1955 Act as “the first serious congressional recognition of the need for federal pollution control”).
29. Id. § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). See also MOELLER, supra note 17, at 358 (“A
I. OVERVIEWS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND CLEAN WATER ACT AND
THEIR CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC HEALTH
A. The Clean Air Act
Historical records demonstrate that the detrimental effect of air pollution
on human health first became evident in the fourteenth century,  and24
regulation of air pollution remains one of the most important aspects of
environmental health.  In wake of a number of deaths attributable to so-called25
“killer fogs”—atmospheric inversions that trap smoke, soot, and industrial
pollutants in relatively confined geographic locations, in urban areas across
the world —Congress recognized in the federal Clean Air Act that “the26
growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles,
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare . . . .”27
The resulting legislation became the core of the contemporary Clean Air
Act (“CAA”).  The first purpose of the Act remains “to protect and enhance28
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population . . . .”  Indeed, this29
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major turning point in progress on the control of air pollution in the United States occurred in 1970 when
Congress amended the Clean Air Act. Two of the most significant requirements of these amendments were
that the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), set by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), provide “an ample margin of safety to protect the public health,” and that limits be established for
controlling emissions from both stationary and mobile sources.”); JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 189, 189–211
(noting that “[t]he effects of unclean air on the public’s health remain key motivations for keeping the act
enforced” and describing the Clean Air Act as a public health measure).
30. See, e.g., Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 18–19 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the EPA
has authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions of hydrocarbons from snowmobiles because
such emissions endanger the public health or welfare); Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 99 F.3d 1551, 1558–59
(holding that EPA’s nonattainment exemptions were valid because they did not violate the Clean Air Act’s
purpose to protect the public health); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 467 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that the EPA’s de minimis exemptions for federal facilities were valid because that did
not violate the Clean Air Act’s public health goal); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA,
655 F.2d 318, 340–42 (holding that waivers of the nitrogen oxide requirements require a finding that the
resulting emissions will not endanger the public health); Natural Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431–33
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that findings that emissions of particulate matter affects public health supports
the EPA’s decision to regulate particulate matter). But see National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v.
EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the EPA could not defend its ultra-low-sulfur
diesel fuel rules on public health grounds when it had not relied on a public health rationale in promulgating
the rule); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1058–59 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the language of the
Act did not allow the EPA to refuse to waive the ban on new fuel additives on public health grounds).
31. Id. § 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2006).
33. Id. § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
34. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 466–67 (2001); see also American
Trucking Ass’ns, v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 371–72 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the EPA’s new NAAQS
for particulate matter were justified on the grounds that new science demonstrated that the old NAAQS did
not adequately protect public health); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 370–71 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(holding that the EPA has the authority to define what size of particulate matter in emissions poses a threat
to public health).
Article views the CAA as a health-based regulatory regime designed to ensure
that all residents of the United States breathe air clean enough to protect the
public health on a national scale.30
Concern regarding the health effects of air pollution permeates the CAA.
Consistent with this focus, the CAA places two significant duties upon the
EPA Administrator: (1) to identify “criteria pollutants,” those air pollutants
the “emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare . . . .”  and (2) “to establish national ambient air quality standards, or31
NAAQS, for each [criteria pollutant]  at levels “requisite to protect the public32
health.”  Both the Act and case law make clear that in establishing the health-33
based NAAQS, the EPA cannot consider economic factors.  Case law has34
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35. American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392–93 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing the NAAQS
that the EPA promulgated for sulfur dioxide on the grounds that the record did not support the EPA’s
conclusion that asthmatics’ exposure did not amount to a public health problem that the NAAQS should
have eliminated).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2006).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7507, 7521, 7547 (2006).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a), (c) (2006). SIPs are comprehensive state plans (or federal plans, if a state
refuses to enacts its own SIP) for ensuring that air quality within the state’s boundaries achieves the
NAAQS. Id. § 7410(a)(1). Thus, SIPs are, ultimately, mechanisms to protect the public health. See Ober
v. Whitman, 243 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the purpose of a Clean Air Act
implementation plan is to meet the NAAQS, which in turn are set to protect the public health).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (2006).
40. Id.§ 7411(a)(3).
41. Id. §§ 7411(a)(1) (defining the “standard of performance” for new stationary sources as “a
standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through
the application of the best systems of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving
such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the
Administrator determines had been adequately demonstrated” (emphasis added)); 7479(3) (2009) (defining
“best available control technology” as “an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction
of each pollutant . . . emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting
authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic ,impacts and
other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and
available methods, systems, and techniques” (emphasis added); 7501(3) (2009) (defining “lowest
achievable emission rate” as “that rate of emissions which reflects . . . the most stringent emission limitation
which is contained in the implementation plan of any State for such class or category of source . . . or . . .
the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in practice”).
42. Id. §§ 7474(a) (distinguishing Class I and Class II areas); 7501(2) (defining “nonattainment
area”); 7502 (2009) (setting out nonattainment area requirements); 7511 (setting forth nonattainment
designations).
also clarified that these standards must be stringent enough to protect the most
sensitive individuals, such as children and asthmatics.35
Once the NAAQS have been established, the CAA provides three primary
mechanisms to ensure that the standards embodied in the NAAQS are met:
(1) fuel  and emissions standards  for mobile sources, such as cars, trucks,36 37
and airplanes; (2) state implementation plans (“SIPs”), designed to ensure that
each state implements mechanisms to achieve the NAAQS  and (3) permits38 39
for stationary sources,  such as factories, with emissions limitations based on40
technological and economic feasibility,  source location,  what kinds and41 42
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43. Id. § 7412, (a)(3), (d).
44. See id. §§ 7412(a)(1) (defining “major source” for purposes of hazardous air pollutant
emissions); 7412(a)(2) (defining “area source” for purposes of hazardous air pollutant emissions); 7475(a)
(applying prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) requirements to “major emitting facilities”); 7479(1)
(defining “major emitting facility”). Importantly, however, the most stringent emissions standards for
stationary sources apply to new sources located in areas that do not meet the health-based NAAQS and to
sources that emit toxic pollutants, reflecting the especially acute public health threats these kinds of
pollutant emissions. Id. §§ 7501–7503 (imposing emissions limitations based on the lowest achievable
emission rate (LAER) and imposing offset requirements on new sources in nonattainment areas); 7412(a),
(d) (imposing emissions limitations based on the maximum achievable control technology (MACT) on
sources that emit hazardous air pollutants, and regulating such sources when they emit as little as 10 tons
of such pollutants per year).
45. Id. §§ 7411(a)(6), 7412(a)(10).
46. Id. §§ 7411(a)(2), 7412(a)(4); 7475(a).
47. Id. §§ 7411(a)(4), 7412(a)(5).
48. Id. § 7411(a)(1) (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 7412(d)(4). See also Patricia Ross McCubbin, The Risk in Technology-Based Standard,
16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 44–45 (Fall 2005) (discussing risk considerations in the technology-
based NESHAPs).
50. Id. § 112(f)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(1), (2) (2006).
51. Id. § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
52. Id. § 211(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(b)(2)(A) (2006); id. § 211(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)
(2006).
amounts of pollutants emitted  or potentially emitted,  and its status as an43 44
“existing”  or a “new”  or “modified”  source.45 46 47
Health considerations inform many determinations underpinning these
mechanisms. For example, EPA must take nonair quality health impacts into
account when setting the basic emissions standard for major new stationary
sources (best available demonstrated technology, or BADT).  For toxic48
pollutants, if “a health threshold has been established, the Administrator may
consider such a threshold level, with an ample margin of safety, when
establishing” the technology-based National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs).  Moreover, EPA and the Surgeon49
General are supposed to consult regarding health risks still remaining even
after application of the NESHAPs, to determine whether even more stringent
health-based emissions standards that “provide an ample margin of safety to
protect public health” are required.  Public health is also a consideration50
when the EPA sets emissions standards for mobile sources (cars and trucks)51
and promulgates regulations for fuel additives.52
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53.
According to a 1988 report to Congress on childhood lead poisoning in America by the
government’s Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, one can estimate that the blood-
lead levels of up to 2 million children were reduced every year to below toxic levels between 1970
and 1987 as leaded gasoline use was reduced. From that report and elsewhere, one can
conservatively estimate that a total of about 68 million young children had toxic exposures to lead
from gasoline from 1927 to 1987.
Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, THE NATION (Mar. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.mindfully.org/Pesticide/Lead-History.htm. Other sources estimate that in the 1970s, 88 percent
of children in the United States had blood-lead levels greater than 10 micrograms per liter, which defines
lead poisoning. Lead Poisoning Resource Center, http://www.aboutlead.com. Lead poisoning in children
can cause speech delay, hyperactivity, attention deficit disorder, learning disabilities, behavioral disorders,
neurological damage, renal damage, stunted growth, anemia, hearing loss, and mental retardation. Id.
Today, only about four percent of children suffer from lead poisoning. Familydoctor.org, Lead Poisoning
in Children, http://familydoctor.org/617.xml (last updated Dec. 2009). See also Centers for Disease Control
& Prevention, General Lead Information: Questions and Answers, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/faq/
about.htm (last viewed Feb. 17, 2007) (“Approximately 310,000 U.S. children aged 15 years have blood
lead levels greater than the CDC recommended level of 10 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood,”
representing “3% of black children compared to 1.3% of white children”). According to the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academies:
the elimination of lead from gasoline and paint may be one of the most significant educational
advances of the 20th century. Research results equate a 10-point drop in blood lead levels with an
average 2.8-point gain in IQ. Since the elimination of lead from gasoline in the United States, we
have witnessed a 15-point drop in blood lead levels. This gives every baby born today a gift of 4–5
additional IQ points. What is this worth economically?
Timothy E. Wirth, Environment and Health: A Connection to the Current Debate, in INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, REBUILDING THE UNITY OF HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
NEW VISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2001).
54. Specifically, the EPA calculated that the costs of compliance with the Clean Air Act were $0.5
trillion, while the benefits from the regulation were worth $5.6 to $49.4 trillion, with a median estimate of
$22.2 billion. U.S. EPA, Executive Summary, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT (EPA 410-R-97-002), at ES-8 (Oct. 1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/
sect812/812exec2.pdf. See also id. at ES-5 tbl. ES-2; ES-7 tbl. ES-4; ES-6 tbl. ES-3.
The public health focus of the CAA has paid off, both literally and
figuratively. As one prominent example, the elimination of lead from gasoline
had immeasurable benefits for public health.  More generally, in 1997, the53
EPA calculated that the benefits of the CAA, consisting largely of avoided
respiratory-related illnesses, cognitive deficits, and death, that accrued in the
two decades following the amendments far exceeded the costs of
implementing the Act.54
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55. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 212–20 (describing the Clean Water Act as a public health
measure); U.S. EPA & Minnesota Dept. of Health, Proceedings of the National Forum on Contaminants
in Fish, May 6 and 9, 2001, at I-10 (emphasizing that “water quality-based programs at both the federal and
state levels seek not only to advise people on ways to minimize public health risks, but also to implement
management measures to reduce the pollution problems so that measures like fish consumption advisories
can be rescinded”), I-11 (“The Clean Water Act goal for water quality adequate to support fishable
conditions wherever possible includes both a goal to protect the ecological integrity of the fish communities
and a human health goal that fish and shellfish should be safe for humans to catch and eat.”) (Aug. 2001).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 53, 54, 91 Stat. 1589-91
(Dec. 27, 1977), and Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 309(a), 101 Stat. 41 (Feb. 4, 1987) (allowing the EPA to set more
stringent effluent standards for toxic pollutants and requiring pretreatment of discharges of toxic pollutants
into publicly owned treatment works).
57. See id. § 1313(i), as added by the Beaches Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health
(BEACH) Act, Pub. L. No. 106-284, § 2, 114 Stat. 870 (Oct. 10, 2000) (requiring all states that had
designated coastal waters for recreational use to adopt more stringent water quality criteria for pathogens).
58. See id. § 1342(p), as added by Pub. L. No. 100-4, §§ 401–405, 101 Stat. 65-67, 69 (Feb. 4,
1987). Urban stormwater runoff is a major source of pathogen contamination of water. Sunny Jiang, Rachel
Noble & Weiping Chu, Human Adenoviruses and Coliphages in Urban Runoff-Impacted Coastal Waters
of Southern California, 67:1 APPLIED & ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 179, 179 (Jan. 2001); Jeff Gottlieb, UC
Irvine Ocean Study Blames Familiar Suspect: Runoff; Germ-laden Discharge Makes Orange County
Waters Worse Than Santa Cruz’s, Experts Find, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, available at
http://www.mindfully.org/Water/2004/Urban-Runoff-Waters6apr04.htm.
59. Sierra Club, America’s Waters at Risk: The Bush Administration Threatens Thirty Years of
Progress Under the Clean Water Act 1 (2005), available through http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanwater.
60. MOELLER, supra note 17, at 26. See also STEVEN JOHNSON, THE GHOST MAP: THE STORY OF
LONDON’S MOST TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC—AND HOW IT CHANGED SCIENCE, CITIES, AND THE MODERN
WORLD 30–44, 103–05, 116–21 (2006) (describing the relationships of sewage, drinking water, and cholera
epidemics in Victorian London).
61. For example, it remains “the national policy that Federal financial assistant to provide to
construct publicly owned waste treatment works.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (2006). See also MOELLER, supra
note 17, at 359 (emphasizing that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 “provided funds for
relevant federal research and associated investigations. Amendments to this act in 1956 authorized the
B. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) also serves to protect public health.55
Indeed, to underscore the connections between water pollution and public
health, Congress has repeatedly amended the Act to address emerging health
threats, such as toxic water pollution,  coastal bacterial contamination,  and56 57
urban storm water runoff.58
Discharges of raw sewage into the nation’s waterways were a public
health problem long before 1948, when Congress enacted the original Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.  “[C]lean water and improved sanitation have59
been major contributors to improvements in the control of infectious diseases,
for example, cholera and typhoid, both of which are transmitted by drinking
water . . . .”  In 1972, when Congress enacted the contemporary CWA,  it60 61
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states to establish water quality criteria and sponsored enforcement conference to negotiate cleanup plans
for bodies of water whose maintenance required the involvement of several states. More important, these
amendments provided federal support for the construction of new municipal sewage-treatment plants.”
(emphasis added)). An entire subchapter of the Clean Water Act (Title II) is devoted to sewage treatment.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1299 (2006). The Title II grants program, now largely replaced by the Title VI State
Revolving Fund, id. §§ 1381–1387, details that “[w]aste treatment management plans and practices shall
provide for the application of the best practicable waste treatment technology before any discharge into
receiving waters, including reclaiming and recycling of water, and confined disposal of pollutants so they
will not migrate to cause water or other environmental pollution . . . .” Id. § 1281(b).
62. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 220 (emphasizing the health problems that sewage still
causes in the United States; for example, “1.8–3.5 million persons in the United States become ill annually
from swimming in waters contaminated by sanitary sewer overflows”).
63. Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators (ASIWPCA),
America’s Clean Water: The States’ Evaluation of Progress, 1972–1982, at 2 (1984), as reprinted in
ASIWPCA, THE CLEAN WATER ACT THIRTY YEAR RETROSPECTIVE: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS RELATED
TO THE FEDERAL STATUTE 461, 464 (2004).
64. To support these goals, as in the Clean Air Act, Congress directed the EPA Administrator to
“conduct research on, and survey the results of other scientific studies on, the harmful effects on the health
or welfare of persons caused by pollutants,” 33 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2006), including the effects of
bioaccumulation. Id. § 1254a. In addition, by January 1, 1973, the Administrator was also to “develop and
issue to the States for the purpose of carrying out this chapter the latest scientific knowledge available in
indicating the kind and extent of effects on health and welfare which may be expected from the presence
of pesticides in the water in varying quantities.” Id. § 1254(l)(1).
65. Id. § 1251(a)(1)–(3).
66. Id. § 1311(a).
67. See id. §§ 1362(12) (defining “discharge of a pollutant” to be “any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source”); 1362(6) (defining “pollutant” broadly to include all “industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water,” with limited exceptions); 1362(7) (defining
addressed this most basic of water-related public health issues  by providing62
grants and loans to build sewage treatment infrastructure throughout the
nation, dramatically decreasing the number of people regularly exposed to
sewage-contaminated waters.63
The CWA also establishes national goals to make the nation’s waters
safer for swimming and fishing.  These goals include “that the discharge of64
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985”; “that wherever
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in
and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983”; and “that the discharge of toxic
pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited . . . .”65
The CWA’s regulatory program begins by stating that, except as in
compliance with the Act’s requirements, “the discharge of any pollutant by
any person shall be unlawful.”  The CWA defines “discharge of a pollutant”66
broadly so that almost any human-controlled addition of almost any substance
to almost any surface water is subject to regulation.  In most cases, to comply67
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“navigable waters” to be “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas”); 1362(14) (defining
“point source” to mean “any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance,” again with limited
exceptions).
68. Id. § 1362(14).
69. Id. § 1344(a).
70. Id. § 1342(a).
71. Id. §§ 1311(b), 1342(a). Professor McCubbin has argued persuasively that even these “pure”
technology-based effluent limitations “tak[e] into account the public health and environmental risks posed
by the industrial facilities to be regulated.” McCubbin, supra note 49, at 3. As she notes, “the underlying
benefit of reducing pollutant discharges is, of course, a reduction in the risks that polluters pose to public
health and the environment.” Id. at 13. Moreover, “[t]he Agency must know a technology’s risk reduction
benefits—measured, if nothing else, by the amount of pollution it reduces—to determine whether ir is the
‘best available.’” Id. at 19.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (2006).
73. Id. §§ 1251(a)(2), 1313(c)(2)(A).
74. Id. § 1312(a). See also, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. U.S. EPA, 35 F.3d 600,
609 (1st Cir. 1994) (upholding the EPA’s denial of a sewage treatment facility’s application for a waiver
from the secondary-treatment-based effluent limitations when there was no showing that the public health
would still be protected from the future effects of the discharge under the relaxed standards).
75. “Toxic pollutants” are “those pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including disease-
causing agents, which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation into any
organism, either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will . . .
cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions
(including malfunctions in reproduction or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring.”
with the CWA, point source dischargers—people discharging pollutants into
water through “any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance,” like a
pipe —must get a permit through one of the Act’s two permit programs—the68
more narrow section 404 for discharges of dredged or fill material,  or the69
more general section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) for all other discharges of pollutants.70
For most dischargers, an NPDES permit will be based on technology-
based effluent limitations for conventional pollutants, nonconventional
pollutants, and toxic pollutants.  Nevertheless, the NPDES permitting71
program also routinely addresses public health considerations. For example,
the Act itself absolutely prohibits the discharge of “any radiological, chemical,
or biological warfare agent, any high-level radioactive waste, or any medical
waste, into the navigable waters.”  Also, to ensure that overall water quality72
can support desired uses, including fishing and swimming wherever possible,73
the EPA must adjust the technology-based effluent limitations whenever those
limitations are insufficient to ensure the attainment and maintenance of water
quality necessary to “assure the protection of public health . . . .”  Finally, the74
EPA has authority to strengthen requirements for discharges of toxic
pollutants,  including prohibiting all discharges of a particular toxic pollutant,75
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33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (2006) (emphasis added). Thus, by definition, regulation of the toxic pollutants is
public health-related regulation.
76. Id. § 1317(a). See also, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 126–27 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(upholding the EPA’s abbreviated procedures in promulgating effluent limitations for toxic pollutants
because those standards were intended to protect the public health, excusing less procedure than the
Administrative Procedure Act usually requires).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2006).
78. Section 404(b)(1) explicitly cross-references Section 403(c), which supplies the quoted
language. Id. § 1343(c)(1)(A).
79. For example, under these Guidelines, “[n]o discharge of dredged or fill material shall be
permitted if it . . . [v]iolates any applicable toxic effluent standard or prohibition under section 307 of the
Act . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(2) (2009). Similarly, the Guidelines prohibit discharges that “will cause
or contribute to significant degradation of the waters” involved, with “significant degradation” explicitly
including “[s]ignificantly adverse effects of the discharge of pollutants on human health . . . .” 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.10(c) (2009). Moreover, under this program, the EPA can prohibit discharges of dredged or fill
material at specific locations whenever “the discharge of such materials into such area will have an
unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . .” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(c) (2006).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2006).
81. Id. § 1314(a)(9)(A). EPA published the new pathogen criteria in November 2004. Water Quality
Standards for Coastal and Great Lakes Recreation Waters; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 67218 (Nov. 16,
2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(i)(1)(A), (3) (2006) (requiring states
to adopt pathogen water quality standards).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006). See also Adams v. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 55–56 (1st Cir. 1994)
(upholding an EPA-issued NPDES permit for wastewater treatment as protective of the public health when
the state certified that compliance with the permit would ensure compliance with the state water quality
standards, including a coliform standard, and the challenger made no showing that an additional virus
if the science indicates that stricter regulation is necessary to avoid damaging
effects on living organisms.76
Section 404 permits, in turn, must comply with the EPA’s section
404(b)(1) guidelines.  The CWA requires the EPA to consider “the effect of77
disposal of pollutants on human health” in establishing the guidelines,  and78
the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines explicitly acknowledge this public health
connection in Section 404 permitting.79
Health considerations are more prominent in the CWA’s general water-
quality goals. To guide states in setting water quality standards, Congress
requires the EPA to develop water quality criteria that “accurately reflect[] the
latest scientific knowledge [] on the kind and extent of all identifiable effects
on health and welfare.”  Moreover, in the 2000 amendments to the Act,80
Congress required the EPA to “publish new or revised water quality criteria
for pathogens and pathogen indicators . . . for the purpose of protecting human
health in coastal recreation waters.”  State-set water quality standards (or81
EPA-set water quality standards, if a state fails to set them) and water quality
criteria must in general “be such as to protect the public health or welfare.”82
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standard was necessary).
83. MOELLER, supra note 17, at 2.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Ben’s Truck & Equip., Inc., 1986 WL 15402, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 12,
1986) (“the Act and the asbestos NESHAP provide strict liability for civil violations of their provisions. . . .
Strict liability is essential to meet the purpose of the Act to protect and improve the quality of the nation’s
air.”).
85. Pound v. Airsol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 2007) (CAA); United States v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2004) (CWA); United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla,
Enters. & Subsidies, 150 F.3d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1998) (CAA); United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp.,
92 F.3d 855, 861 (9th Cir. 1996) (CAA); United States v. B&W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir.
1994) (CAA); United States v. Winchester Mun. Utils., 944 F.2d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 1991) (CWA); United
States v. West of England Ship Owner’s Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n, 872 F.2d 1192, 1198 (5th Cir. 1989)
(CWA); Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg’l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986) (CWA); Matter
of Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 343 (2d Cir. 1981) (CWA); United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599
F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979) (CWA); United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th
II. STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS IN FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL
LAWS AND THE STATUTORY DIMENSION OF PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION
As Part I demonstrates, public health considerations pervade the Clean
Water and Clean Air Acts. Thus, any violation of either Act is likely to impair
the public health to some degree.83
Nevertheless, agencies cannot realistically enforce against all violations
equally aggressively despite potential public health impacts. Indeed,
environmental enforcement decisions do not occur in a vacuum, but instead
reflect a number of simultaneous realities: (1) some violations are worse than
others; (2) some particularly severe violations are more directly damaging to
the environment than to public health; and (3) the EPA and implementing
states exercise a great deal of discretion in determining when to take “serious”
enforcement actions—actions beyond a mere administrative notice of
violation. This part explores the public health-related statutory constraints (if
any) on the enforcement agencies’ exercise of their enforcement discretion;
the next part will explore how the EPA has actually chosen to exercise its
enforcement discretion.
A. The Enforcement Starting Point: Administrative and Civil
Strict Liability
In order to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements and the
eventual attainment of their overall regulatory goals,  liability under the Acts,84
as with most federal environmental statutes, is strict:  any violation of the85
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Cir. 1978) (CWA).
86. Thus, under the Clean Air Act, the state or the EPA Administrator must at least issue a
compliance order when “any person has violated or is in violation of any requirement or prohibition of an
applicable implementation plan or permit,” 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (2006), or has violated any requirement
of the acid rain program, the Title V permit program, or the stratospheric ozone program. Id. § 7413(a)(3).
Similarly, under the Clean Water Act, the EPA or the state must at least issue a compliance order any time
a person discharges without a permit, discharges in excess of allowed effluent limitations, violates the
recordkeeping and reporting requirements, or otherwise violates the terms of the person’s NPDES or section
404 permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1), (3) (2006).




90. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
statute—discharging or emitting pollutants without a permit, exceeding the
permit limitations, or failure to monitor and report—warrants an enforcement
action by the implementing state or the EPA.86
Moreover, unlike strict liability claims in tort law, damages are not an
element of the government’s enforcement action.  That is, the enforcing87
agency need not prove that a particular discharge of water pollutants or
emission of air pollutants causes either measurable environmental harm or
harm to particular persons in order to be able to prosecute an enforcement
action and assess monetary penalties against the violator.  Indeed, by creating88
a strict liability regime and eliminating damages as an element of enforcement,
Congress attempted to remedy the “tragedy of the commons” and proof-of-
causation problems that plagued environmental litigation under the common
law of torts.  Instead, the federal pollution control statutes effectively remove89
causation and injury from the individual to the collective: the Acts recognize
that, collectively, polluters have created levels of air pollution and water
pollution in many locations that are unhealthy and otherwise undesirable from
a public interest perspective and provide a means of reducing or eliminating
that pollution.
Nevertheless, this “no damages” strict liability regime also allows the
conceptual disconnection of statutory violations from any actual injury—to
the environment, to public health, or to individuals. Moreover, the ability to
categorize a legal violation as “technical” or “no injury” has enforcement
consequences. For example, in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,  citizens of90
Puerto Rico sued to enjoin the U.S. Navy’s weapons training operations on
Vieques Island, arguing that the Navy was violating the Clean Water Act by
discharging ordnance into coastal waters without a permit. The district court
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92. Id. at 309–10. In fact, the district court strongly suggested that, by rendering those waters off-
limits to civilians, the Navy’s operations actually improved the environmental quality of Vieques’ marine
waters. Id. at 310 n.4 (quoting Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 682 (D.P.R. 1979)).
93. 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982).
94. Id. at 315.
95. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006) (the Clean Air Act’s primary government enforcement
provision); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006) (the Clean Water Act’s primary government enforcement mechanism).
agreed that a violation of the CWA was occurring;  however, it refused to91
enjoin the Navy’s operations, finding that the weapons training—i.e., bombing
of the ocean—caused no environmental harm.  The U.S. Supreme Court92
agreed with the district court, emphasizing that “[t]he integrity of the Nation’s
waters, . . . not the permit process, is the purpose of the” CWA.  As a result,93
because in this case “the discharge of ordnance had not polluted the waters,”
the district court’s decision not to issue an injunction was justified when “it
neither ignored the statutory violation nor undercut the purpose and function
of the permit system.”94
Thus, the perception of harm, whether to public health or the
environment, can be critical to the agencies’ and courts’ assessments of
“appropriate” enforcement. Most environmental statutes, moreover, give
agencies a range of enforcement options, as the next section details.
B. Levels of Statutory Enforcement
Of course, not all violations of the federal pollution control statutes are
merely technical; some rather dramatically damage the environment, impair
public health, or cause personal injury. The federal pollution control statutes
acknowledge these distinctions by allowing for differential enforcement:
enforcement agencies can take stronger enforcement actions against more
significant violations, as defined in statutes and enforcement policies.
Specifically, the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts allow the federal and
delegated state governments to pursue a range of administrative, civil, and
criminal enforcement options.95
These graduated enforcement mechanisms reflect the violator’s intent and
the actual harm created or risked. They thus allow enforcing agencies to tailor
enforcement to reflect actual individual contributions to the regulatory
commons problem and to more dramatically punish particularly harmful
violations. Nevertheless, the Acts are remarkably silent regarding the relevant
considerations for distinguishing administrative from civil enforcement. They
are, however, more specific regarding the elements that make criminal
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98. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1)(B), (3)(A), (5)(B) (2006).
99. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA or the Army Corps of Engineers
“shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation, or violations,
and, with respect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of such violations, the degree of
culpability, economic benefit or savings (if any) resulting from the violation, and such other matters
as justice may require.”
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (2006).
Under the Clean Air Act, if the EPA does choose to assess administrative penalties, its authority is
“limited to matters where the total penalty sought does not exceed $200,000 and the first alleged date of
violation occurred no more than 12 months prior to the initiation of the administrative [enforcement]
action,” unless the Administrator and the Attorney General decide otherwise. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1)
(2006). Field citations are limited to $5,000 per day of violation. Id. § 7413(d)(3). Criteria for setting the
amount of the penalty include,
(in addition to such other factors as justice may require) the size of the business, the economic
impact of the penalty on the business, the violator’s full compliance history and good faith efforts
to comply, the duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence . . . , payment by
the violator of penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the economic benefit of
noncompliance, and the seriousness of the violation.
Id. § 7413(e)(1).
enforcement appropriate, and these elements display some evidence of
congressional solicitude for personal injury and public health impairment.
1. Administrative Enforcement
Administrative enforcement actions are those enforcement actions that
occur within the agency itself. Thus, under the Acts, if the relevant state
refuses to take an enforcement action, the EPA must at least issue a notice of
violation and compliance order against any person who violates the
requirements that the Acts and the related regulations impose.  These orders96
give violators a deadline by which to come into compliance with the relevant
regulatory requirements.97
However, violators can also be subject to administrative penalties.  The98
Acts provide little guidance regarding when the EPA or the state should go
beyond a compliance order and seek monetary penalties. However, the Acts
do provide a list of relevant factors for determining the amount of any
administrative penalties assessed.99
Neither set of statutory criteria for compliance orders or administrative
penalties expressly lists threats to public health as a consideration.
Nevertheless, threats to public health are certainly relevant in assessing the
seriousness of the violation and perhaps also in the catch-all “other factors.”
Thus, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the EPA fairly clearly has
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authority to consider public health in administrative enforcement actions
against persons who violate the CAA and CWA. Nevertheless, threats to
public health need not be present for administrative enforcement to occur, nor
is the presence or absence of public health threats in any way determinative
of the EPA’s decisions regarding what kind of administrative enforcement to
take or the level of administrative penalties to impose.
2. Civil Enforcement
Agencies also have the option of referring cases to the U.S. Department
of Justice for enforcement via civil suit (“ civil enforcement actions”). Under
the CWA, for example, the EPA “is authorized to commence a civil action for
appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any
violation for which he is authorized to issue a[n administrative] compliance
order . . . .”100
While the CAA is more complex regarding how it groups types of
violations, it similarly states that if the EPA finds that “any person has
violated or is in violation of any requirement or prohibition of an applicable
implementation plan or permit,” and the relevant state refuses to take an
enforcement action, it can issue a compliance order, assess administrative
penalties, or bring a civil enforcement action in court.  For any other kind of101
violation except violations of the new source requirements, the EPA can
pursue the full panoply of enforcement options—administrative compliance
orders, administrative penalties, civil enforcement in court, or criminal
enforcement.  Finally, with respect to violations of the requirements for new102
or modified sources, the CAA provides that the EPA may administratively
“issue an order prohibiting the construction or modification” of the violating
stationary source, assess administrative penalties, or bring a civil action;
moreover, the United States retains the right to bring a criminal action if
warranted.  The CAA targets civil enforcement actions at “any person that103
is the owner or operator of an affected source, a major emitting facility, or a
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105. United States v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 591 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2010);
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396–97 (9th Cir. 1995); Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990); Stoddard v. West Carolina Regional Sewer Auth.,
784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986).
106. Under the CWA,
[i]n determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of the
violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such
violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact
of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006). Under the CAA, the factors are identical to those for administrative
penalties—that is, the courts
shall take into consideration (in addition to such other factors as justice may require) the size of the
business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business, the violator’s full compliance history
and good faith efforts to comply, the duration of the violation as established by any credible
evidence (including evidence other than the applicable test method), payment by the violator of
penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the economic benefit of noncompliance, and
the seriousness of the violation.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2006).
107. See infra notes 192–219 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 326 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038–39 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
major stationary source,” but it also includes “any other person” and directs
the EPA to pursue civil enforcement “as appropriate.”104
Neither statute provides criteria for choosing between administrative and
civil enforcement. Therefore, the federal environmental statutes do not
themselves privilege public health protection as an appropriate factor in
deciding between administrative and civil enforcement.
3. Civil Penalties
The Acts allow the courts to assess civil penalties as part of civil
enforcement; in fact, some case law indicates that civil penalties are
mandatory in civil enforcement actions.  Moreover, both statutes list factors105
for the courts to consider in determining the appropriate amount of the civil
penalty.106
As with administrative penalties, Congress did not explicitly list public
health as a factor for courts to consider in assessing civil penalties under the
Acts. Nevertheless, consideration of the seriousness of the violations and other
relevant factors can allow public health considerations to factor into the civil
penalty amount.  Indeed, courts often stress these injuries when imposing107
particularly large penalties. For example, one federal district court upheld an
increased civil penalty under the CWA because of risks to the public health
from the violating discharge.  Another federal district court, while noting108
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that actual environmental harm was not necessary to find a violation “serious”
and hence deserving of increased civil penalties, similarly emphasized that
“nevertheless, the evidence at trial showed that defendants’ discharges
constituted both an actual and a potential threat to the public health and the
environment,” cementing the defendants’ civil penalty liability.109
4. Criminal Enforcement
As one might expect, given the heightened constitutional requirements in
criminal law, federal pollution control statutes tend to be more detailed
regarding the circumstances under which criminal prosecutions are
appropriate. Under the CWA, for example, criminal penalties are available is
against any person who:
negligently [or knowingly] introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly owned
treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such person knew or
reasonably should have known could cause personal injury or property damage or . . .
which causes such treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or condition in any
permit issued to the treatment works . . . .110
Similarly, the Act more stringently punishes violations of the permit
requirement, effluent limitations, effluent standards, pretreatment
requirements, or monitoring and reporting requirements if serious human
injury is likely to result. These criminal negligence provisions have a clear
connection to the public health: the CWA will criminally punish any person
who negligently upsets the operation of sewage systems and sewage treatment
plants, whether the injury is direct (the pollutant or hazardous substance
causes bodily injury) or indirect (the pollutant or hazardous substance cause
the plant to violate its own discharge requirements, potentially leading to the
discharge of raw or partially treated sewage).
The CAA also connects some of its criminal sanctions to public health
and personal injury. For example, negligent actions may incur criminal
liability only when a person negligently releases listed hazardous air
pollutants or non-listed substances that are “extremely hazardous” and thereby
“negligently places another person in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury . . . .”  Defendants who knowingly release such hazardous111
pollutants and knowingly endanger other people face substantially greater
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§§ 7413(c)(1) (imposing imprisonment for up to five years for knowing violations of state implementation
plans, administrative enforcement orders, new source performance standards, national emission standards
for hazardous air pollutants, inspection requirements, requirements for hazardous waste combustion,
preconstruction requirements, emergency orders, permitting requirements, acid rain requirements, or ozone
reduction requirements); 7413(c)(2) (imposing imprisonment of up to two years for false statements or
failure to install or maintain monitoring equipment); 7413(c)(3) (imposing imprisonment terms of up to one
year for failure to pay fees).
114. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083
(1990) (“RCRA’s purposes, like those of the Food and Drug Act, ‘. . . touch phases of the lives and health
of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.’”
(quoting United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (construing criminal intent requirements
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act))); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283–86 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied sub nom. Mariana v. United States, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995) (citing Hoflin while
concluding that the Clean Water Act is also a public welfare statute). But see United States v. Ahmad, 101
F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that, despite the fact that “[o]n its face, the [CWA] certainly does
appear to implicate the public welfare,” the exception was narrow and did not apply).
115. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.
Mariana v. United States, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
prison sentences and/or fines —the potential imprisonment term for knowing112
endangerment is at least three times longer than for any other “knowing”
crime under the Act.  Moreover, these provisions single out releases of113
hazardous air pollutants, which can have not only immediate and acute
impacts on individual well-being but also longer term impacts on public
health.
Thus, in the criminal context, the Acts evidence Congress’s particular
concern to punish violators who culpably put specific individuals or the
general public at risk. Moreover, the federal courts have generally underscored
the connection between criminal prosecutions under the federal pollution
control statutes and public health protection and personal injury prevention by
routinely classifying these statutes as “public welfare statutes” akin to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.  In the words of the Ninth Circuit, “The114
criminal provisions of the [CWA] are clearly designed to protect the public at
large from the potentially dire consequences of water pollution, . . . and as
such fall within the category of public welfare legislation.”115
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III. EXERCISING AGENCY ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION: THE EPA’S
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Part II shows that, outside of criminal enforcement, the EPA has
considerable discretion under the federal pollution statutes regarding whether
and when to privilege public health considerations in environmental
enforcement. Moreover, while the EPA cannot refuse to take any enforcement
actions, the realities of budget and personnel limitations generally require the
EPA to prioritize its pollution enforcement efforts on some grounds.
Therefore, the choices that the EPA makes could have potentially
significant effects on the extent to which its environmental enforcement
promotes public health goals. First, if the EPA chooses to highlight or target
certain types of violations, either by the industry involved or by the kind of
harm caused, it may effectively privilege certain regulatory goals over others.
Second, in choosing among administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement
options, the EPA can signal that it considers certain types of violations to be
more important or “serious” than other types of violations.
Finally, the EPA’s own enforcement rhetoric can signal how
important—or, perhaps more cynically, how valuable for public relations
purposes—it deems public health goals to be in its enforcement decisions.
OECA’s enforcement reports, therefore, can provide important clues regarding
the role of public health in the exercise of the agency’s enforcement
discretion.
A. Prioritization: EPA’s National Enforcement Priorities
The EPA has regularly set national priorities for enforcement efforts
pursuant to the various federal pollution control statutes, including the Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts. These priorities have increasingly promoted the
statutes’ public health goals.
1. FY2008–FY2010 Enforcement Priorities
In June 2007, OECA announced the EPA’s six national enforcement
priorities for FY2008–FY2010.  All of these national priorities promote116
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human health protection, even while simultaneously advancing environmental
protection more generally.
For example, the EPA chose to emphasize the CAA’s technology-based
national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs) through
FY2010, noting that these standards “regulate the most hazardous air
pollutants (HAPs) and those posing the highest degree of risk to human health
and the environment. By ensuring compliance with [these] standards, the
Agency reduces public exposure to toxic air emissions.”117
Similarly, under the CWA, the EPA has prioritized “discharges from wet
weather events,” which “represent significant threats to public health and the
environment.”  OECA emphasized that sanitary sewer overflows (SSOs) and118
combined sewer overflows (CSOs) involve discharges of raw sewage, which
contain “bacteria, viruses and other pathogens” and can lead to beach and
shellfish bed closures. In addition, wet weather discharges from concentrated
animal feeding operations (CAFOs) regularly contain high levels of fecal
coliform.119
Public health concerns also inform the EPA’s other national enforcement
priorities—financial responsibility, new source review and prevention of
significant deterioration under the CAA, mineral processing, and tribal
capacity —to a significant degree. For example, according to OECA,120
“[f]inancial responsibility protects public health and the environment by
promoting the proper and safe handling of hazardous materials and protecting
against a liable party defaulting on closure or clean up obligations.”121
Implementing the new source review requirements in areas with already good
air quality helps to ensure that this air quality remains in compliance with the
health-based NAAQS.122
In its description of the mineral processing national priority, OECA
primarily emphasizes that “[t]he mishandling of mineral processing wastes
causes significant environmental damage and results in costly cleanups. These
highly acidic wastes cause fish kills” and “severe impacts” on wildlife.123
However, it also notes that the acid wastes “elevate levels of arsenic and
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cadmium in residential wells” and that many of these contaminating “facilities
are in close proximity to populations, and the health risk to people living near
these facilities is of significant concern to the EPA.”124
The national tribal strategy arguably has a more oblique connection to
public health. Nevertheless, as OECA emphasizes, “[s]ignificant human health
and environmental problems, associated with several media programs, are
present in Indian country,” and “[t]he tribal strategy’s primary goal is to
significantly improve human health and the environment in Indian country
through the EPA working with tribes on compliance assistance, compliance
monitoring, and enforcement activities.”125
OECA’s general program guidance for FY2008 also reveals a pervasive
concern for public health issues. For CWA programs, for example, it stated
that:
Priority water areas include watersheds, public drinking water intakes or designated
protection areas, waters that could impact shellfish beds, waters with threatened or
endangered species, waters designated as primary contact recreation, and waters located
in areas with environmental justice concerns . . . .126
Watersheds and waters with endangered and threatened species reflect
ecosystem and biodiversity goals, but the other four categories of priority
waters have more-or-less direct connections to human health, from protecting
drinking water to avoiding tainted shellfish to protecting humans from
exposure to contaminated water.
Given the pervasive health-based focus of the CAA, identifying
“discretionary” promotion of health-focused enforcement is more difficult.
Nevertheless, OECA has effectively instructed the EPA regional offices and
the states to emphasize air toxics and new source review (and the health
benefits of these programs, as emphasized in the national priorities discussion)
even at the expense of other CAA programs. It noted in its FY2008 guidance
that these aspects of the CAA remain priorities and that for all other programs
under the Act, “the regions should [merely] continue to maintain a minimum
level of activity consistent with the resources available for implementing the
program . . . .”  Arguably, promotion of more directly health-related127
programs is most obvious in OECA’s treatment of the Title V permitting
program: OECA instructed the EPA regions to conduct compliance
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134. The automotive service and repair sector contributed chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) and volatile
organic compounds to the atmosphere, “reducing the ozone layer that protects the earth from harmful
ultraviolet radiation” and “contributing to ground level ozone,” respectively. Id. at A-1. Coal-fired power
evaluations only for those Title V major sources “that emit or have the
potential to emit emissions at or above 80% of the Title V source
threshold” —that is, only for the worst contributors to air pollution and its128
impacts on public health.
2. FY2008–FY2010 Priorities Compared to National Enforcement
Priorities in the Last Decade
In some respects, the national priorities for FY2008–FY2010 reflect long-
term prioritizations in EPA enforcement goals. For example, as far back as
FY1999, the EPA listed agricultural practices and CAFOs as enforcement
priorities,  and CWA wet weather problems became priority national129
problems in FY2001.  CAA toxics and new source review also became130
national enforcement priorities in FY2001.131
In other ways, however, the EPA’s national enforcement priorities shifted
in FY2008. With the exception of the minerals processing priority, OECA’s
FY2008–FY2010 enforcement priorities take a broad programmatic approach
to enforcement prioritization. In contrast, in FY1999, OECA’s 11 national
priorities targeted individual industrial sectors—agriculture/CAFOs,
automotive service and repair shops, coal fired power plants, chemical
preparation, dry cleaning, industrial organic chemicals, iron and basic steel
products, municipalities, petroleum refining, primary nonferrous metals, and
pulp mills.  OECA selected these sectors “based on several factors, including132
compliance history, regional and state concerns, national scope of the sector,
and potential environmental and human health risk identified from pollutant
loadings and Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) risk data.”133
While many of the targeted sectors clearly raised public health concerns,
OECA often failed to emphasize those public health aspects.  Indeed, “public134
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health” or “human health” was explicitly relevant only for CAFOs  and the135
primary nonferrous metals sector.136
By FY2001, OECA largely set aside its sector-based prioritization for a
programmatic- and problem-based approach, although it did include the
petroleum refining sector as an enforcement priority.  Moreover, three of the137
FY2001 national priorities have clear and emphasized connections to public
health protection, including: CWA wet weather problems, where overflows
from CAFOs , CSOs, and SSOs “contain bacteria and other pathogens which
cause illnesses and lead to impaired waters, including beach and shellfish bed
closures”;  Safe Drinking Water Act microbial rules, compliance with which138
helps to avoid “adverse health effects of microbiological contamination
includ[ing] gastrointestinal distress, fever, pneumonia, dehydration (which can
be life threatening), or death”;  and Clean Air Air toxics, enforcement139
against which helped to reduce “public exposure to toxic air
emissions . . . .”  OECA did not emphasize public health concerns for the140
priorities of CAA new source review and prevention of significant
deterioration, the petroleum refinery sector, or Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) permit evaders.141
National enforcement priorities in FY2002 were identical to those in
FY2001.  However, for FY2005 through FY2007, enforcement priorities142
expanded to include not only air toxics, new source review, petroleum
refining, CAFOs, CSOs and SSOs—all of which EPA explicitly connected to
potential health problems—but also stormwater, mineral processing, financial
responsibility, tribal issues, and environmental justice;  RCRA permit143
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evaders dropped out as a priority. EPA did not emphasize public health
impacts from stormwater,  but noted that “[l]arge-scale mineral processing144
and mining operations often severely affect water supplies and wildlife and
create environmental damage. Many facilities are located in populated areas,
making health risks a significant concern for EPA.”  Similarly, “[h]aving the145
financial resources to perform closure and cleanup are an important part of
protecting human health and the environment from solvents, dioxins, oils,
heavy metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and other dangerous
pollutants that contaminate soils, ground water, surface waters, and
sediments.”  The tribal focus sought to address “significant human health146
and environmental problems associated with drinking water, solid waste, and
environmental risks (e.g., lead-based paint),”  while the environmental147
justice priority sought to “provide an environment where all people enjoy the
same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal
access to the decision-making process to maintain a healthy environmental in
which to live, learn, and work.”  Thus, public health concerns were explicitly148
relevant to all but one of the 10 national enforcement priorities for FY2005 to
FY2007. Moreover, the EPA completed its petroleum refineries enforcement
initiative at the end of this period, emphasizing that the eliminated or reduced
air pollutants “contribute to respiratory illness and heart disease, childhood
asthma, acid rain, and reduced visibility.”149
3. Ambivalence in the Enforcement Guidance Overall
While the FY2008–FY2010 national enforcement priorities suggest a
particularly strong focus on public health-related goals—a focus that has been
increasing since FY1999—the FY2008 national program guidance
nevertheless also indicates ambivalence regarding the overall place of health-
based enforcement priorities nationwide. For example, OECA stated that,
within the CWA NPDES permit program, “each violation deserves some type
of enforcement response.”  Similarly, under the CAA,150
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Federal enforcement will be considered where delegated agencies fail to take appropriate
action. In addition, regions should take appropriate federal enforcement actions in
situations where federal involvement could be particularly helpful in bringing the matter
to a successful and environmentally beneficial resolution . . . or is essential to ensure fair
and equal environmental protection mandated by law.151
Thus, OECA has not taken—and probably could not officially take—any
enforcement actions “off the table.”
Moreover, OECA has contextualized the more health-focused national
priorities within six categories of enforcement actions of particular interest:
(1) National Enforcement Priority cases/inspections; (2) regional enforcement Priority
cases/inspections; (3) Multimedia inspection/cases; (4) Cases involving violations at
multiple facilities; (5) Cases/Inspections involving large and sophisticated corporations
whose violations have demonstrable environmental impact; (6) and cases involving
facilities categorized as SNC [Significant Noncompliers], HPV [High Priority Violators],
or another category of repeat “bad actor.”152
Thus, the national enforcement priorities and their health-based focus are only
one subset of the EPA’s national and regional enforcement priorities, many of
which do not include an explicit public health connection. Indeed, Categories
(3) through (5) target more wide-spread violations and violations with
significant environmental harm, while Category (6) targets particularly
culpable violators.
As this Article goes to press, the EPA has announced its candidate
enforcement priorities for FY2011–FY2013.  These candidates include air153
toxics under the CAA, CAFOs under the CWA, environmental justice, Indian
Country drinking water under the Safe Drinking Water Act, marine debris,
mineral processing, municipal infrastructure, new sources review and
prevention of significant deterioration under the Clean Air Act, RCRA
enforcement, RCRA financial assurance, resource extraction, pesticides at day
care facilities, surface impoundments, wetlands, and worker protection
standards.  This list suggests that both continuing (air toxics, CAFOs) and154
new (pesticides at day care facilities, worker protection) environmental health
and human safety considerations will continue to influence EPA enforcement
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priorities but also, again, that public health concerns will not necessarily
dominate pollution enforcement.
B. Choosing Among Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Enforcement
As noted, aside from imposing heightened intent requirements and
additional elements for criminal liability, the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts
provide remarkably little guidance to the EPA and state enforcement agencies
regarding the “proper” level of enforcement against particular violations. To
a large extent, therefore, these choices—and the values that they reflect—are
largely matters of EPA enforcement discretion.
With respect to the Clean Water Act, EPA issued its Guidance on
Choosing Among Clean Water Act Administrative, Civil and Criminal
Enforcement Remedies  in 1987 (the 1987 CWA Guidance), and those155
principles remain in effect for the agency. The 1987 CWA Guidance
recognizes that enforcement choices balance general guidance and principles,
EPA priorities, and budget and personnel resources.156
With respect to the Clean Air Act, EPA issued its Guidance on Choosing
the Appropriate Forum in Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Enforcement
Actions in 1991 (the 1991 CAA Guidance).  This guidance responded to the157
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act and their expansion of the EPA’s
administrative enforcement options under that Act,  and it remains in effect.158
1. Administrative Enforcement
a. Clean Water Act
The 1987 CWA Guidance emphasizes that “EPA as a general rule should
choose the least resource-consuming enforcement option that will do the
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job . . . .”  As a result, EPA’s default position is to pursue administrative159
enforcement unless there is some reason not to; as the 1987 Guidance states
explicitly, “the real issue is when not to use this administrative penalty
authority.”  Nevertheless, the Guidance also indicates that administrative160
enforcement is particularly appropriate for “paperwork violations”—late filing
of Daily Monitoring Reports (DMRs), failure to file DMRs—and for minor
violations warranting only small, if any, penalties.161
The 1991 CAA Guidance is less decisive about its preference for
administrative enforcement, but that ambivalence derives from the statutory
limitations on administrative enforcement —not the public health goals of162
the Act. As a result:
It is important that the Agency view this new authority as a supplement to, not a
replacement of, the Agency’s existing civil judicial enforcement program. The
administrative forum will provide a more streamlined enforcement option, suitable for
addressing many violations. There are, however, statutory limits on the use of
administrative remedies.163
One such limitation is the cap on penalties. As a result, the guidance advises
that EPA can pursue administrative enforcement for even multiple violations
of the Act, so long as the total penalty remains below $200,000.  Moreover,164
field citations are most appropriate for truly minor violations.165
2. When Civil Enforcement Is Appropriate
a. Clean Water Act
Under the 1987 CWA Guidance, the EPA’s choice to pursue civil
enforcement is largely disconnected from public health concerns. Relying on
legislative history from the Water Quality Act of 1987, which amended the
CWA to give the EPA administrative penalty authority, the 1987 Guidance
suggests that civil court enforcement is “‘necessary for cases involving novel
issues of law or contested penalty assessments, cases requiring injunctive
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relief, serious violations of the Act, or large penalty actions, and cases where
remedies are sought requiring significant construction or capital
investment.’”  As a general rule, where the EPA does not believe that the166
combination of administrative penalties and a compliance order will stop the
violation, or where delays from the administrative enforcement process are
likely to result in ongoing violations, “or in any situation where the
noncompliance is serious and continuing and the violator is uncooperative, the
EPA should commence a civil action to obtain a TR or preliminary injunction
enjoining further violations.”167
Nevertheless, more specific EPA enforcement guidance suggests that
significant risks to either human health or the environment warrant injunctions
and hence warrant civil enforcement in court. For example, the EPA issued
new enforcement guidance for CAFOs in 2003.  The CAFO guidance168
instructs the EPA regional offices to develop enforcement plans that target
“CAFO noncompliance problems at the largest facilities in the State or Region
which pose significant human health or environmental risks and identify the
appropriate enforcement response necessary to achieve compliance.”  “A169
principal factor to consider when initially selecting a CAFO sector or
watershed for investigation, should be whether discharges present a significant
human health or environmental risk.”  The guidance emphasizes injunctive170
relief (requiring CAFOs to get NPDES permits and to use Best Management
Practices)  and hence privileges civil enforcement, and it promotes “an171
overall general deterrence message.”  The EPA also committed to providing172
assistance to the Regions “to measure the environmental and/or human health
outcomes of their enforcement activities.”  Certain “large CAFOs with173
significant enforcement problems” can become candidates for national rather
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than regional enforcement actions.  Finally, the guidance emphasizes that174
“[t]he Region should initiate follow-up enforcement, including administrative
and judicial actions under Sections 309 and 504 of the CWA” and “should
adhere to the Agency’s national policy of escalating enforcement
responses . . . for continuing noncompliance . . . .”  In effect, therefore, the175
more significant a CAFO’s effects on human health and the environment are
deemed to be, and the longer those violations continue, the more likely that the
Region will pursue civil enforcement.
b. Clean Air Act
The relevant factors that the EPA will consider for civil enforcement
under the 1991 CAA Guidance are similar to those in the 1987 CWA
Guidance—and similarly fail to privilege public health considerations. For
example, the CAA Guidance emphasizes that “[l]ong-term, court-supervised
injunctive relief is available only in the judicial forum.”  In addition, if the176
EPA chooses to conduct extensive discovery or pursue penalties of more than
$200,000, it should pursue enforcement in federal court.  Finally,177
When an enforcement action involves novel legal issues, the Agency must carefully
weigh the decision to pursue the action in the administrative or judicial forum. A
favorable opinion in federal district court will set a substantially stronger beneficial
precedent that will a favorable administrative opinion. However, when an enforcement
action arises in a judicial district which has been hostile to the Agency’s interest in the
past, the action might be better brought in the administrative forum even if it involves
precedential issues.178
Thus, the 1991 CAA Guidance presents the choice between administrative and
civil enforcement as being primarily a matter of strategic and procedural
considerations, not one based on the level of harm caused or risked—although
penalty consideration may serve as indirect proxies for environmental and
public health considerations.
Nevertheless, as with the CWA, more specific EPA enforcement guidance
for the CAA indicates that significant public health effects warrant court
involvement. For example, violations of air toxic emissions requirements
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qualify as High Priority Violations (HPV) warranting enhanced enforcement
efforts.  If these violators do not resolve their violations within nine to ten179
months (270 to 300 days), they will generally be subjected to court
enforcement actions.180
c. Public Health Effects and Injunctions in the Federal Courts
Beyond influencing the EPA’s decision to go to court, public health
concerns increase both the need for and the likelihood of getting injunctive
relief. Specifically, when enforcement does occur in federal court and judges
acknowledge that violations of pollution control statutes put the public health
at risk, they are far more likely to enjoin such violations, both preliminarily
and permanently. For example, in Weinberger the U.S. Supreme Court noted
that court orders requiring immediate cessation of discharges would be
appropriate when illegal discharges presented “‘an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons . . . ’”  Similarly, a federal district181
court has held that broken sewer lines that resulted in an ongoing discharge of
raw sewage warranted a permanent injunction against the operator, in large
part because of the serious risk posed to the public health.182
In addition, acknowledged public health effects from environmental
violations can influence the court’s balancing of harms in the injunction
analysis, both by rendering an increased risk legally cognizable and by
underscoring that injury to the public health is by definition injury to many
individual members of the public. For example, in one of the earliest
regulatory pollution control cases, risk to the public health justified an
injunction in a case that involved taconite pollution of Lake Superior.183
Science suggested, but had not definitely proven, that taconite, a form of
asbestos, might cause health problems through either or both of two exposure
routes: air and water. Because of the lack of definitive proof of causation,
however, the more traditional injunction, intended to stop “demonstrable
danger to the public health,” was unavailable.  Nevertheless, relying on184
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Minnesota’s state air pollution laws and public nuisance  for the air exposure185
risk and the pre-1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act for the water
exposure risk,  the Eighth Circuit issued the injunction anyway, satisfied that186
the taconite pollution posed a public health risk that should be stopped.187
Finally, in many jurisdictions, the public health aspects of pollution
regulation changes the very nature of the balancing test for injunctive relief.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, for example, has held
that because the CWA is an environmental and public health statute, the focus
in an injunction evaluation shifts from “irreparable harm” to concern for the
general public interest.  Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of188
Oregon refused to balance in Oregon State Public Interest Research Group v.
Pacific Coast Seafoods,  a CWA citizen suit seeking to enjoin discharges189
from a seafood processing plant that included E. coli and enterococcus
bacteria, both of which cause gastroenteritis.  The Oregon District Court190
concluded that “courts are not required to balance the equities when the
moving party is a government agency or a citizen standing in its place, such
as the case of CWA plaintiff-citizen suits, or where the activity to be enjoined
may endanger the public health.”191
3. Calculating Penalties
a. Clean Water Act
Under the 1987 CWA Guidance, the EPA will generally seek civil
penalties in civil enforcement actions where the primary goal is an
injunction.  However, if the agency perceives a need for substantial civil192
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penalties (more than $125,000) or a substantial risk that the administrative
penalty decisionmaking process will result in a disproportionately low penalty,
a civil rather than administrative enforcement action is warranted.  As a193
result, the EPA’s overall civil penalty policies are relevant to the choice
between administrative and civil enforcement actions.
The EPA generally considers impacts to the public health when
determining the penalties it seeks against violators. Indeed, in its 1995 CWA
settlement penalty policy,  the EPA noted that, in its enforcement actions, it194
“seeks substantial monetary penalties which promote environmental
compliance and help protect public health by deterring future violations by the
same violator and deterring violations by other members of the regulated
community.”  The EPA seeks to fulfill four goals in assessing civil penalties:195
deterring noncompliance, ensuring a level playing field, imposing consistent
penalties across the country, and using logical calculation methodologies.196
To ensure a level playing field among regulated entities, “every effort
should be made to calculate and recover the economic benefit of
noncompliance.”  The economic benefit component ensures that violators do197
not profit from their violations to the disadvantage of competitors.198
Full deterrence, however, requires the agency to take into account the
seriousness of the violation, which is captured in the gravity component of the
civil penalty calculation.  EPA calculates the gravity component of CWA199
civil penalties by adding together four components: the significance of the
violation; health and environmental harm; the number of effluent limit
violations; and the significance of non-effluent limit violations, such as
monitoring and reporting violations.200
The penalty policy clearly promotes stiffer penalties for violations with
actual or potential public health impacts in the first two of these components.
Regarding the significance of the violation, violations of effluent limitations
for toxic pollutants are weighted more heavily than other kinds of violations,
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and fecal coliform violations are also treated specially.  In turn, the health201
and environmental harm component applies for each “month in which one or
more violations present actual or potential harm to human health or the
environment.”  Within this component, moreover, impacts on human health,202
such as through contamination of drinking water or subsistence fishing, earn
weights of 10 to 50 points, while impacts on the aquatic environment that
implicate human health concerns, such as fish kills, beach closures,
restrictions on waterbody use, or interference with a sewage treatment plant,
earn weights of 4 to 50.  All other environmental impacts earn weights of 1203
to 25 points.  Thus, violations implicating public health concerns can204
influence civil penalty calculations at least twice as heavily as similarly
serious “purely” environmental harms.
The 1995 policy allows for adjustments to the gravity component based
on three factors: flow reduction; the history of the violator’s recalcitrance; and
quick settlement.  While the last two factors focus on the violator, the first205
allows for reductions in the gravity component if the violator’s facility has
lower flows of effluent into the affected waterbody and hence poses less
overall risk of public health or environmental harm.206
b. Clean Air Act
As noted above, the 1991 CAA Guidance specifies that, if EPA pursues
enforcement against “violations resulting in a calculated penalty of over
$200,000, the violations should be pursued through a judicial action.”207
However, given the health-based nature of the CAA, the Guidance’s linking
of large penalty assessments to court enforcement suggests that violations that
result in substantial risk or harm to the public health will result in judicial
rather than administrative enforcement actions.
The EPA published its current civil penalty policy for stationary sources
at nearly the same time that it published its 1991 CAA Guidance.  Under this208
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policy, and very similarly to the CWA penalties, calculation of administrative
and civil penalties begins with two factors:  the economic benefit conferred209
by the violator’s noncompliance  and a “gravity component” that reflects the210
seriousness of the violation.  The penalty should, at a minimum, require the211
violator to disgorge the economic benefit it received from violating the Act.212
Public health considerations are most relevant to the gravity component,
which in general the violator cannot mitigate away.  Nevertheless, public213
health is relevant to only the first of the gravity component’s three
considerations, which include actual or possible harm; the importance of the
violation to the CAA’s regulatory scheme; and the size of the violator.214
The “actual or possible harm” consideration asks “whether (and to what
extent) the activity of the defendant actually resulted or was likely to result in
the emission of a pollutant in violation of the level allowed by an applicable
State Implementation Plan, federal regulation or permit.”  Five factors are215
relevant to this inquiry, the first four of which can take account of public
health effects: the amount of pollutant; the sensitivity of the environment,
especially in terms of nonattainment areas; toxicity of the pollutant; length of
time of violation; and size of the violator.  Each hazardous air pollutant216
involved in the violation warrants $15,000 in penalties, according to the
policy. Similarly, if a regulated party violates the CAA by emitting criteria
pollutants into nonattainment areas—that is, areas already violating the health-
based NAAQS—the policy dictates penalties of between $10,000 and
$18,000, depending on the pollutant and the area’s level of nonattainment.217
Thus, the policy emphasizes the types of violations that most directly
undermine the CAA’s health-based goals.
The EPA can then adjust the calculated penalty in light of the violator’s
conduct (degree of willfulness or negligence, degree of cooperation, and
history of noncompliance) and/or the environmental damage caused.  Again,218
public health considerations can be relevant to this last factor. Indeed, as its
example of “severe environmental damage” that would warrant increased
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penalties, EPA offered “a significant release of a toxic air pollutant in a
populated area.”219
4. Criminal Enforcement
Criminal enforcement does not offer the EPA the same range of
prosecutorial discretion as the choice between administrative and civil
enforcement. Most importantly, the EPA must be able to prove criminal intent,
and this absolute requirement has almost nothing to do with the public health
(or environmental, for that matter) impact from the violation. In addition, to
succeed with criminal enforcement, the prosecution must be able to prove the
specific elements described in the pollution control statutes.
This emphasis on criminal intent pervades the EPA’s enforcement
policies. For example, despite the 1987 CWA Guidance’s basic preference for
undertaking the smallest expenditure of resources necessary to achieve
compliance, usually administrative enforcement, the EPA has recognized that
criminal enforcement may be warranted “even if a civil action or
administrative enforcement would achieve compliance.”  The EPA has220
indicated that enforcement offices should commence criminal investigations
any time there is evidence of negligent or knowing violations and that
“[c]riminal enforcement rather than administrative penalty proceedings should
be taken for serious violations that are knowing or negligent.”  Echoing this221
view, in its FY2008 enforcement guidance, OECA noted that “[i]n situations
where violations are knowingly and willfully committed, EPA uses criminal
enforcement actions.”  Indeed, public health impairment is only one of seven222
factors that EPA listed in the 1987 CWA Guidance for determining whether
criminal enforcement is appropriate, and then only obliquely, as—“Did the
conduct involve a particularly dangerous material?”  The other factors focus223
on the violator’s culpability, the foreseeability of environmental harm, and the
EPA’s deterrence goals.224
Criminal enforcement guidance is even more limited for the CAA.
Congress significantly expanded the EPA’s criminal enforcement authority in
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the 1990 amendments to the CAA.  Because the 1991 CAA Guidance225
focuses on the distinction between administrative and civil enforcement, it
notes only that “criminal violations must be addressed in a criminal judicial
action.”  However, the EPA’s 1993 criminal enforcement guidance for the226
CAA notes that the 1990 amendments “will have a significant impact upon the
number and types of CAA criminal investigations. The primary focus of
criminal cases under the prior CAA was upon violations of the National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulations
governing asbestos removal procedures.”  Thus, the 1990 amendments227
represented a significant broadening of criminal enforcement beyond a fairly
specific health threat to “groundbreaking and challenging investigations and
prosecutions of new statutory provisions and their progeny regulations.”  In228
particular, EPA emphasized that the new Title V permit program “will be
similar to the CWA’s NPDES permitting program, which has been the source
of many good criminal cases.”229
Even so, as with its new administrative enforcement authority, the EPA
tended to emphasize the statutory limitations on its criminal enforcement
authority. For example, stationary source criminal liability focuses on owners
and operators, and “Congress wanted criminal responsibility of an owner or
operator to be limited to senior management and corporate officers, except in
instances where the criminal violation was of a ‘knowing and willful’
magnitude of intent.”  In addition, the EPA emphasized that information230
obtained during self-audits should normally not be the basis for criminal
prosecutions,  and it excluded violations of mobile source and fuel standards231
from criminal sanctions.232
Thus, considerations of public health effects would seem to play a rather
limited role in the exercise of the EPA’s discretion with respect to criminal
enforcement under either Act. Nevertheless, the EPA can choose between civil
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and criminal enforcement on the basis of these effects—a fact that becomes
most clear in its civil penalty policies. For example, in its 1991 stationary
source civil penalty guidance for the CAA, the EPA allows evidence of
knowing or negligent conduct to be one reason for enhancing civil penalties.233
Similarly but less explicitly, the 1995 CWA civil penalty policy allows the
EPA to enhance civil penalties based on the violator’s recalcitrance, which can
include bad faith and failure to comply with prior orders,  both of which234
speak to the violator’s intent. Thus, despite broad language promoting
criminal enforcement any time the violator possesses the requisite intent, the
EPA has left itself the option of pursuing some potentially criminal violations
through civil enforcement even when the requisite intent is present, suggesting
that the gravity of the potential public health or environmental impacts plays
a role in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
C. The EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Reports, FY1999 to FY2009
Subparts A and B indicate that the EPA often considers public health
effects in establishing its enforcement policies and priorities, even if it does
not focus exclusively on those impacts. One would expect, therefore, that the
EPA (acting through OECA) would emphasize public health impacts in its
assessments of its enforcement accomplishments.
Nevertheless, OECA’s rhetoric of enforcement assessment has varied
considerably over the last decade, particularly with respect to the outcome
measures that it chooses to highlight. Many of these measures are purely
quantitative accountings of the enforcement actions themselves—number of
administrative orders issued, number of civil and criminal cases filed, total
values of the administrative and civil penalties assessed and criminal fines
imposed, number of criminal convictions, years of jail time sentenced, value
of injunctive relief obtained, money violators had to spend on pollution
control equipment, and money violators had to spend on supplemental
environmental projects (SEPs). While these can provide measures of EPA
enforcement effort, they supply almost no indication the actual environmental
or public health benefits that enforcement provided.
To be meaningful, assessments of these public benefits from the EPA’s
enforcement almost always have to be at least partially qualitative and
descriptive: What specific harms did an enforcement action stop or prevent?
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However, the EPA and OECA often prefer purely quantitative measures here,
as well, especially for environmental protection outcomes. Such measures of
environmental outcomes typical include pounds of pollutants reduced or
eliminated, cubic yards of soil decontaminated, and gallons (or other volume
measure) of water treated. While these measures provide some basic
indication of environmental benefit (clean is generally better than dirty) and
are easily compared from year-to-year, they lack both the rhetorical power and
the depth of meaning that more qualitative and descriptive evaluations can
provide.
OECA enforcement reports over the last decade have shifted from almost
purely quantitative to pervasively qualitative and descriptive back to mainly
quantitative assessments of EPA enforcement activities. As a result, despite
the increasing role that public health considerations have played in the setting
of national enforcement priorities, OECA often obscures the public health
benefits of environmental regulation and enforcement, especially for programs
other than the CAA.
1. OECA’s Enforcement Report for FY1999235
In July 2000, OECA published its enforcement report for FY1999. In
summarizing the EPA’s accomplishments for that year, the report stressed
quantitative measures rather than qualitative assessments of environmental or
public health impacts. Thus, according to Assistant Administrator Steven
Herman’s opening summary:
Enforcement actions concluded in FY99 will reduce over 6.8 billion pounds of
pollutants. Additionally, polluters were required to spend a record $3.4 billion to correct
violations and take steps to protect the environment. We also achieved a record $236.8
million in environmentally beneficial projects. A record $166.7 million in civil penalties
was assessed, including the largest Clean Air Act settlement in history against seven
diesel engine manufacturers who used illegal devices to disable their emission control
systems. This case alone will result in 75 million tons of nitrogen oxide reductions over
the next quarter century. We took 3,935 civil judicial and administrative enforcement
actions in 1999, the highest number of civil actions taken over the last three years.236
This quantitative rhetoric promoted a deterrence/punishment vision of
environmental enforcement, divorced from any real attempt to explain the
public benefits of the EPA’s enforcement actions. The summary of criminal
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enforcement reflected a similar vision of environmental enforcement, despite
a mention of public benefit as well:
Our strong criminal enforcement program reflects our goal of punishing those who
callously disregard our nation’s environmental laws and who put the public at serious
risk when they do so. Most significantly in 1999, a record 208 years of jail time was
imposed on criminal defendants. This increase in sentences is extremely important as a
deterrent to others. A prison sentence is personal—it’s not a cost of business that can be
passed onto the consumer.237
One explanation for this rhetorical style is the fact that the 1999 Report
incorporated “new outcome measures for evaluating the behavioral and
environmental results of our activities”  developed in OECA’s February238
1997 National Performance Measures Strategy (NPMS).  These outcome239
measures did not include public health benefits, instead emphasizing increased
rates of compliance and pollutant reductions.  Only in Phase II of the NPMS,240
to begin in FY2000, would OECA evaluate “environmental and human health
improvements from compliance assistance” and “environmental and human
health improvements from integrated initiatives.”241
Even so, OECA still emphasized that its “compliance monitoring program
often entails making a targeted effort to reduce significant noncompliance
(SNC) in high-priority areas (i.e., those areas posing the most significant
public health and environmental risks).”  Moreover, an entire section of its242
report was entitled “Protecting the Environment and Your Health Through
Compliance Monitoring Activities.”  Similarly, the report emphasized that243
the “EPA gives priority to taking enforcement actions that reduce the greatest
risks to human health or the environment and produce maximum
environmental benefit,” and OECA’s “enforcement program also acts swiftly
to address conditions that may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment.”244
Nevertheless, and perhaps as a result of the phasing of the NPMS, OECA
only rarely reported the public health benefits of its enforcement actions in
FY1999, and often even then only obliquely. For example, it noted that its
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settlement of a Safe Drinking Water case involving the Army’s Redstone
Arsenal in Alabama “will protect Redstone’s water system.”245
Public health considerations did take center stage in some of OECA’s
descriptions of particular enforcement actions. For example, an agreement
between the EPA, the City of Manchester, New Hampshire, and the New
Hampshire Department of Environmental Services to address the City’s CSO
discharges into the Merrimack River “includes a 10-year, $52.4 million plan
to remove the majority of sewer overflows into the river” and “also includes
environmental and public health projects,” such as “a $500,000 program to
reduce childhood asthma and lead poisoning.”  A phosphorus facility in246
Idaho would better manage its wastes to prevent the release of “phosphine and
hydrogen cyanide, highly toxic gases that can cause serious health and
environmental problems”; it also committed to a $63 million program to
improve air quality in the region and a $1.65 million public health assessment
and education program to investigate the effects of [its contaminants] on
human health and the environment, particularly within nearby tribal lands.”247
New York City entered into a consent decree that required it to filter its
Croton water supply, because “filtering drinking water substantially reduces
the risk of waterborne disease in surface water systems, which are more
susceptible to potential contamination from human and animal wastes and
from microbial contaminants.”248
Thus, the FY1999 enforcement report did explain the public health
benefits of some specific pollution-related enforcement actions. However, the
overall rhetoric of the report places far more emphasis on basic compliance,
on punishment, and on raw reductions in pollutants than on the specific public
health or environmental benefits of the EPA’s enforcement efforts.
2. OECA’s Enforcement Report for FY2001249
The OECA’s next enforcement report, published in 2002, reported on
FY2001 enforcement activities and reflected a change in presidential
administration. In his opening greeting, Assistant Administrator Suarez put far
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less emphasis on the quantitative aspects of the EPA’s enforcement efforts and
more on improving the environment and public health and safety:
Reducing pollution is a primary goal for the enforcement and compliance program. Last
year we and our partners prevented millions of pounds of harmful pollutants from being
released into the environment and ensured that billions of pounds of pollutants were
safely treated and managed. We also required violators to spend nearly $1 billion on
environmental improvement projects—up 60 percent from the previous year.250
In the same vein, the “EPA’s enforcement and compliance assurance
program’s mission is to protect human health and the environment by ensuring
that regulated entities, federal, state, tribal, and local governments comply
with our nation’s environmental requirements for keeping our air, land, and
water clean.”  From the very beginning of the report, therefore, OECA251
emphasized, if subtly, the public benefits of environmental enforcement,
including public health.
Part of this change in focus reflects the full implementation of the NPMS.
As OECA noted, the “EPA’s enforcement and compliance assurance program
is focused on producing measurable results to protect public health and the
environment. . . . EPA is now actively engaged in using outcome data to
improve program effectiveness and ensure accountability to the public.”252
Even the deterrence function of enforcement took on a more publicly-
minded rhetoric. Thus, the
EPA and each state have an enforcement program to ensure that laws lead to the results
that Congress and the public want. . . . Although directed at a specific violator,
enforcement causes a deterrent effect that motivates other people and companies to
comply and ensures a level playing field for those companies that do not violate the
law.253
Injunctive relief served to “undo past harm and prevent future damage to the
environment,” while civil penalties “eliminat[ed] economic advantage gained
through noncompliance.”254
2010] PUBLIC HEALTH ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 51
255. Id. at 21.
256. Id. at 22.
257. Id. at 27.
258. Id. at 26.
259. Id. at 33.
260. Id. at 33–34.
261. Id. at 37.
262. Id.
OECA’s explanations of why particular enforcement actions matter
became more qualitative and detailed in the 2001 report, with respect to both
health and environmental goals. For example, with respect to CAFOs, OECA
explained that the pollutants from CAFOs “can kill fish, cause excessive algae
growth, and contaminate drinking water. In addition, emissions of air
pollutants from very large CAFOs may result in significant health effects for
nearby residents.”  An emergency order issued against the Tommy Naylor255
Farm CAFO in North Carolina sought to prevent nitrate contamination of
drinking wells, because “[d]rinking water with high levels of nitrate can cause
serious illness and even death in infants and small children.”  With respect256
to toxics, the EPA “targeted enforcement at sources with high risk for
emissions of air toxics,” which are “the most hazardous air pollutants as well
as those posing the greatest risks to human health and the environment
because they are released frequently or in large amounts.”  The EPA thus257
criminally punished Koch Industries’ failure “to properly control [emissions
of] benzene, a known carcinogen.”258
A similar emphasis on the public health benefits of pollution enforcement
emerges in the report’s discussion of regional enforcement efforts. For
example, “EPA Region 2 held a mercury reduction and pollution prevention
workshop for federally owned healthcare facilities to better educate healthcare
staff on minimizing and properly handling hazardous wastes,”  while Region259
3 entered consent agreement with AK Steel to reduce nitrate contamination of
Connoquenessing Creek, a source of drinking water, to the health-based
standard under the Safe Drinking Water Act.  Region 8 “issued an260
emergency administrative order requiring several oil companies to deliver full
replacement water for all household uses . . . to 20 families whose private
water supply have, or are risk of having, unsafe levels of the contaminants
benzene and total dissolved solids.”  Region 9 addressed drinking water261
supplies contaminated by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) leaking from
underground gasoline storage tanks.262
Thus, the FY2001 report presented a fairly dramatic shift in
environmental enforcement assessment rhetoric, from mere quantitative
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assessment of pollutants reduced and fines assessed to qualitative explanations
of the public benefits that derive from environmental enforcement. Public
health protection, as noted, played a prominent role in this new mode of
reporting.
3. OECA’s Enforcement Report for FY2002263
OECA’s FY2002 enforcement report reads much like its 2001 report.
Administrator Christine Todd Whitman stressed in her opening message that
“[m]illions of pounds of harmful pollutants will be reduced, cleaned up or
treated, and all of us will enjoy cleaner air, water, and land.”  Moreover, the264
EPA focused its enforcement resources “on cases that posed the most serious
threats to public health and the environment.”  Assistant Administrator265
Suarez emphasized the universal goal of environmental and public health
protection,  stressed that the EPA was for the first time reporting “a wider266
range of results achieved through our enforcement actions in the areas of
groundwater, wetlands, and drinking water protection,”  and underscored the267
EPA’s role in homeland security investigations, including the anthrax
investigation in Washington, D.C.268
The FY2002 report announced that the EPA’s mission “is to improve the
environment and protect human health by ensuring compliance with
environmental requirements, preventing pollution and promoting
environmental stewardship.”  Civil enforcement focused on “significant269
noncompliers” who “are the worst polluters, based on the history and
magnitude of their violations,”  while “[c]riminal actions are pursued against270
those who callously disregard our nation’s environmental laws and who put
the public at serious risk when they do so.”271
OECA reported for the first time on how enforcement actions were
leading to groundwater treatment, connecting such treatment to safe public
water supply: “an estimated 2.8 billion gallons of groundwater will be
treated,” and “more than 3 million people will be served by drinking water
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systems that will be brought into compliance” as a result of FY2002
enforcement actions.  The EPA also “secured commitments for the reduction272
of more than an estimated 260 million pounds of harmful pollutants . . . .”273
In addition to commenting on public health impacts from several specific
enforcement sectors,  as it had in FY2001, OECA in its FY2002 report also274
took time to articulate the public benefits more generally of “cleaner air,”
“purer water,” and “better protected land.” For example:
Air pollution threatens the health of human beings and other living things on our planet.
While often invisible, pollutants in the air create smog and acid rain, cause cancer or
other serious health effects, diminish the protective ozone layer in the upper atmosphere
and contribute to the potential for world climate change. Almost 170 million tons of
pollution are emitted into the air each year in the United States. Approximately 133
million people live in areas where monitored air quality is unhealthy.275
Less expansively, OECA connected water pollution enforcement to “safe
sources of drinking water, edible fish, swimmable beaches, and healthy
watersheds.”  Finally:276
Improper waste handling, management and disposal practices present significant
environmental threats. These improper activities also economically undercut facilities
that operate in compliance with the provisions of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) and could lead to future contaminated sites under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA
or Superfund).277
RCRA in particular “is intended to protect human health and the environment
from the hazards posed by handling and disposal of wasters.”278
Thus, in its FY2002 enforcement report, OECA continued its rhetorical
commitment to qualitative evaluations of its enforcement actions. Moreover,
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it emphasized that the public health and environmental benefits of
environmental enforcement cut across all media.
4. FY2003 Enforcement Assessment279
In the press release announcing the EPA’s enforcement accomplishments
for FY2003, OECA returned to a primarily quantitative assessment:
In addition to the approximately 600 million pounds of pollutants to be reduced,
treated or properly managed, EPA enforcement resulted in the treatment of over 3.7
million tons (7.5 billion pounds) of contaminated soil. Last year, EPA began estimating
as well the gallons of contaminated groundwater to be treated (6.5 billion), acres of
wetlands that will be restored (1,050), and the number of people served by drinking water
systems that will be brought into compliance (2 million) as a result of EPA enforcement
activity.
As a result of enforcement settlements, almost $2.9 billion in injunctive relief will go
toward the cleanup of polluted sites and protection against further environmental
harm. . . . In addition, the value of Supplemental Environmental Projects, which are
undertaken voluntarily as a result of an enforcement settlement action, were up 12
percent to $65 million this year.
In the Superfund Program, EPA secured private party commitments for cleanup and
cost recovery that exceeded $1.1 billion. More than 87 percent of new remedial action
starts at non-federal Superfund sites were initiated by private parties.280
Some of these measures, such as treatment of soil and restoration of wetlands,
certainly suggest public benefits, even though OECA did not spell out those
benefits. Similarly, EPA Assistant Administrator Suarez strove to connect the
quantitative data to public health. “‘EPA’s going after what really
counts—reducing pollution and protecting public health,’ said Suarez. ‘We
don’t count our success in the number of notices of violation we write, as
some would suggest.’”  This quotation reveals some EPA sensitivity to281
merely quantitative accounting and also a distinction between counting EPA
enforcement activities—notices of violation—and counting things that matter
more to environmental and public health goals, such as pounds of pollutants
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removed, investments in pollution control technologies, and supplemental
projects.
Nevertheless, quantitative assessments—including the counting and
comparing of various types of EPA enforcement efforts—dominated OECA’s
summaries for FY2003.  Even in its enforcement highlights, OECA drew282
explicit connections between particular enforcement actions and human well-
being—qualitative assessments related to public health—for only a handful
of the 23 specific enforcement actions that it described in more detail, even
though many involved CAA violations, sewage problems, oil spills, PCB
contamination, and asbestos exposure.283
5. FY2004 Enforcement Assessment
In its press release reporting on EPA’s FY2004 enforcement
accomplishments, OECA again stressed many of the largely unilluminating
quantitative measures of enforcement effort:
EPA enforcement actions concluded in fiscal year (FY) 2004 will reduce a projected one
billion pounds of pollution and require cleanups estimated to total a record $4.8
billion—significant increases from last year. Other annual measures of the Agency’s
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enforcement and compliance activity—such as the number of inspections (up 11 percent
from FY 2003) and investigations (up 32 percent from FY 2003)—surpassed or kept pace
with previous years, indicating continued progress in deterring violations of the nation’s
environmental laws and reflecting an emphasis on environmental benefits and
compliance.284
Nevertheless, EPA Acting Assistant Administrator Tom Skinner stressed that
“‘EPA’s enforcement strategy is focused on what matters most: achieving real
environmental improvements that benefit everyone.’”285
Indeed, a few of the quantitative measures that OECA provided strongly
suggested public benefits from environmental enforcement: “3.4 million cubic
yards of contaminated soil and sediment and 9.5 million cubic yards of
groundwater will be cleaned up, 1,300 acres of wetlands will be protected, and
the drinking water of four million Americans will comply with EPA
standards.”  Moreover, in its enforcement highlights, OECA again explicitly286
connected some enforcement actions to public benefits, most often by
generally describing the benefits of particular enforcement programs or
priorities. For example, coal-fired electric plants illegally emit “pollution that
causes smog, acid rain and soot.”  Similarly, sewer overflows were287
acknowledged to have multiple impacts on human health and the environment:
Combined sewer overflows (CSOs) and sanitary sewer overflows (SSOs) typically
contain pollutant concentrations that can cause or contribute to violations of water quality
standards, precluding the use of the water body for swimming, boating, fishing or such
activities. CSOs and SSOs also contribute to beach closings, shellfish bed closures,
contamination of drinking water supplies and other environmental damage because they
discharge untreated wastewater that contains microbial pathogens, suspended solids,
toxics, nutrients, trash and pollutants that deplete dissolved oxygen.288
Enforcement of the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act—a federal statute that requires private entities to report releases of toxic
substances into the environment —also had a direct public benefit, because289
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such enforcement “helps ensure that the public has timely access to
information about releases of chemicals in the community by providing a
stronger incentive for facilities to submit their reports on time,”  while290
Supplemental Environmental Projects achieved a number of different kinds
of public benefits:
Lead-based paint abatement and diesel school bus retrofits focused on improving
children’s health removing harmful pollutants from their environment. Numerous
settlements included emergency response supplemental environmental projects in which
hazardous response equipment was provided to local communities. Finally,
environmental restoration supplemental environmental projects provided for improved
water quality, restoration of wetlands, and conservation of environmentally important
properties.291
Such qualitative descriptions were notably lacking, however, for certain
enforcement programs important to public health, such as the National Lead-
Based Paint Enforcement Program and enforcement of CERCLA.292
OECA was often more specific (and more graphic) about the public
benefits of its criminal enforcement actions. For example, a hazardous waste
enforcement action against AAD Distribution and Dry Cleaning Services in
California involved “drums of PERC, a cancer-causing hazardous waste,”
while Rhodia, Inc.’s illegal storage in Montana of elemental phosphorus-
contaminated sludge “posed a serious threat to the environment and human
safety since elemental phosphorus waste can spontaneously ignite when
exposed to air, creating a risk of explosion.”  Similarly, RT Automotive’s293
illegal disposal of paint fumes was made graphically relevant when “[t]wo
police officers and four firefighters required medical evaluation after
approaching the trailer because of exposure to fumes.”  Saybolt Inc.’s294
falsification of oxygen tests on gasoline explicitly threatened public health,
because sub-standard gasoline causes “[h]igh automobile emissions[, which
in turn] lead to high atmospheric ozone levels, which increase the incidence
of breathing disorders such as emphysema and asthma.”  David van Dyke’s295
improper handling of sewage sludge at the Warsaw, Indiana, wastewater
treatment plant led to “the release of untreated sewage into the creek, which
killed thousands of fish in Walnut Creek between late July and early August
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2002,” while Industrial Zeolite in Louisiana “released 1.1 million gallons of
wastewater exhibiting a high pH into a ditch that flows into the Callahan
Bayou,” which “can harm fish and wildlife.”296
Nevertheless, the great weight of OECA’s performance measures for
FY2004 were purely quantitative.  Especially in comparison to the297
qualitative and graphic details provided for many criminal enforcement
efforts, these quantitative measures did not meaningfully convey the public
health import of the EPA’s enforcement efforts.
6. FY2005 Enforcement Assessment
Quantitative measures also dominated in OECA’s assessments for
FY2005 enforcement. For example, in that year’s press release, OECA
emphasized that:
EPA enforcement actions in fiscal year 2005 resulted in legal commitments by
companies, governments and other regulated entities to reduce a projected 1.1 billion
pounds of pollution and require that they spend a record $10 billion to come into
compliance with environmental laws. This is an increase of $5 billion over last year.
EPA’s criminal enforcement program helped successfully prosecute some of the largest
environmental crimes in history in FY 2005, with judges imposing significant sentences
and large criminal fines.298
This quantitative emphasis did not quite jibe with EPA Assistant
Administrator Granta Y. Nakayama’s assertion that “‘EPA’s enforcement
strategy and accomplishments demonstrate our commitment to achieving
cleaner air, cleaner water and healthier communities.’”299
However, as noted above, FY2005 was also the first year that OECA
began to monetize public health benefits from enforcement. Moreover, it
contextualized those benefits among other more direct public benefits from the
EPA’s enforcement efforts:
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Among the environmental benefits resulting from agency actions during FY 2005, EPA
estimates that 28.2 million cubic yards of contaminated soil and 1.6 billion cubic yards
of contaminated water will be cleaned up; 1,900 acres of wetlands will be protected; and
the drinking water of more than 8 million Americans be safer. Criminal defendants will
pay $100 million in criminal fines and restitution and serve more than 186 years in jail.
Our 10 biggest air pollution cases will reduce more than 620 million pounds of pollutants
annually and that will produce annual human health benefits valued at more than $4.6
billion. The benefits include reductions in premature mortality, bronchitis,
hospitalizations and work days lost.300
Moreover, as in its FY2004 reporting, OECA provided a few explicit
insights into the public health benefits of its civil enforcement efforts outside
of the CAA program. As one example, as a result of a CWA enforcement
action:
At a cost estimated at $2 billion, Los Angeles will rebuild at least 488 miles of sewer
lines and clean 2,800 miles of sewers annually to reduce by about 46 million gallons the
raw sewage discharged annually—by a system that serves 3.8 million people. In addition
to a $1.6 million penalty to be shared equally between the United States and the Los
Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles will perform $8.5 million
in environmental projects throughout the city to restore streams and wetlands and to
capture and treat polluted storm drain flows.301
The Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District in Kentucky
agreed to “perform $2.25 million in environmental projects to provide public
health screenings for residents of neighborhoods adjacent to industrialized
areas, raise environmental awareness and convert and reclaim a landfill into
a public use area” as part of the CWA enforcement action against it, and “EPA
entered into legally binding agreements with 11 major domestic airlines and
nine smaller airlines to ensure the safety of the drinking water used by their
passengers and crew.”  Finally, “Camwest and BP agreed to implement302
supplemental environmental projects on the Wind River Indian Reservation
that will provide significant environmental improvements to the drinking
water systems of the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho tribes.”303
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Also as in the FY2004 reporting, OECA was more likely to supply
specific and graphic details about the public benefits of its criminal
enforcement actions. An asbestos prosecution against AAR Contractors, for
example, recognized that “[t]he defendants directed illegal activities of 500
asbestos workers and laboratory officials. As many as 100 former AAR
workers are now substantially likely to develop asbestosis, lung cancers or
mesothelioma, a fatal form of [lung] cancer.”  Bouchard Transportation304
Company’s spill of 98,000 gallons of industrial fuel off of Cape Cod “killed
450 protected birds, forced the closure of thousands of acres of the bay’s
shellfish beds for several months for cleanup, and polluted nearly 90 miles of
Massachusetts shoreline,” while at Motiva Enterprises:
workers were sent to the refinery’s acid tank farm to repair a catwalk connecting the
tanks. Flammable vapors ignited, producing an explosion that knocked a 415,000 gallon
capacity tank containing spent sulfuric acid off its foundation, killing one worker and
injuring numerous others. Additionally, approximately 99,000 gallons of spent sulfuric
acid drained into the Delaware River for days after the explosion killing thousands of fish
and crabs.305
Finally, Kerrville Painting Company was criminally prosecuted for improperly
sandblasting and painting bridges in Arkansas, because “[b]ridge sandblasting
and painting typically generates wastes contaminated with lead that must be
disposed of properly to avoid exposure of the public, fish and wildlife to lead
and lead compounds. Exposure to sufficient quantities of lead can cause
neurological and developmental disorders in humans.”306
Nevertheless, as in prior years, OECA emphasized quantitative measures
of enforcement accomplishments. As a result, these few case highlights and
the new monetization of public health benefits of CAA enforcement often
became lost in the more traditional quantitative measures.307
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7. OECA Enforcement Report for FY2006308
The next formal OECA enforcement report did not appear until 2007 and
covered FY2006. Assistant Administrator Granta Y. Nakayama’s opening
message stressed both qualitative and quantitative enforcement measures. For
example, he claimed that EPA was “making significant progress in protecting
the nation’s environment and public health, and achieving lasting
environmental results”  and emphasized that the criminal enforcement309
program focused “on cases that have the largest environmental impact,”
maximizing the EPA’s “impact in protecting human health and the
environment.”  At the same time, even though nine of the ten national310
enforcement priorities for FY2006 had explicit public health connections,311
he stressed only that these “priority enforcement activities are responsible for
nearly 75 percent of the 890 million pounds of pollutant reductions achieved,
as well as more than 70 percent of the $4 billion worth of investments in
pollution prevention and control obtained in injunctive relief.”312
For the first time, however, OECA also formally reported health benefits
in financial and qualitative terms. While monetization of such benefits is
another form of quantitative assessment, it is a quantification of qualitative
benefits—we now know the actual public health value of such enforcement,
not just the tons of pollutants reduced or penalties assessed. The differences
in rhetorical impact are difficult to miss, especially because OECA connected
the monetized public health benefits to specific descriptions of those benefits.
Thus, civil air enforcement in FY2006 “resulted in a total of more than 583
million pounds of pollutants reduced,” which “will have substantial benefits
for public health”:313
The annual human health benefits from these air emission reductions are valued at $3.5
billion. The health benefits include reducing premature deaths among people with heart
or lung disease, preventing hundreds of cases of bronchitis and nonfatal heart attacks, as
well as preventing thousands of cases of respiratory ailments, including aggravated
asthma.314
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Although not expressed in financial terms, OECA’s description of its
work in environmental justice also underscored the public health importance
of this national enforcement priority. OECA listed eight national
environmental justice priority efforts, five of which directly promote health:
reducing asthma attacks, reducing toxic air pollutants, reducing blood lead
levels, ensuring that fish and shellfish are safe to eat, and ensuring that water
is safe to drink.  Two others—ensuring that companies meet environmental315
laws and revitalizing brownfields and contaminated soils —can also have316
fairly immediate public health impacts. The eighth priority, collaborative
problem-solving,  emphasizes procedure rather than health or environmental317
results—but problem-solving can certainly contribute to either one.
However, beyond air enforcement and environmental justice, the 2006
enforcement report approaches public health rhetoric far less enthusiastically
than it approaches the importance of the EPA’s enforcement priorities. For
example, throughout its 2006 report, OECA emphasized that prioritization was
an effective approach to environmental enforcement. Thus, “74 percent of the
total pollution reductions and 71 percent of the total pollution prevention and
control investments obtained by the civil enforcement program in FY2006
were in national priority areas.”  Similarly, after explaining the dramatic318
health benefits of air enforcement, OECA noted that “[t]he most significant
air pollution reductions for enforcement actions concluded in FY2006 resulted
from OECA’s work in national priority areas.”  It also emphasized its319
enforcement success in its water enforcement priorities  and the fact that it320
opened 24 criminal enforcement cases in six national priority areas.321
Moreover, despite the fact that almost all of the national priorities have
explicit connections to public health, OECA preferred non-health quantitative
measures for its performance in areas other than air enforcement. Such
measures included, for example, 26 million pounds of pollutant reductions
from CSOs and SSOs and investments of $930 million in sewer system
upgrades,  a $10.25 million penalty in an enforcement action under the Toxic322
Substances Control Act,  154 years in jail and $43 million in criminal fines323
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for the criminal enforcement program, $391 million to study and clean up 15
million cubic yards of contaminate soil and 1.3 billion cubic yards of
contaminated ground water,  and $400,000 in penalties from plus $125324
million “to clean up more than 850 million cubic yards of soil, sediment, and
water” at federal facilities.325
8. OECA Enforcement Report for FY2007326
OECA’s enforcement report for FY2007, published in May 2008, states
that “OECA’s mission is to improve the environment and protect public health
by ensuring compliance with the nation’s environmental laws.”  As in the327
report for FY2006, OECA emphasized the public health benefits of air
enforcement but opted for a quantitative assessment of enforcement in other
programs.
For the air programs, OECA again both monetized the public health
benefits of its enforcement actions and qualitatively described those benefits.
For example, in his opening message, Assistant Administrator Nakayama
emphasized that:
EPA’s 12 largest stationary source air enforcement cases alone will reduce more than 500
million pounds of harmful air pollutants, with annual human health benefits estimated
at $3.8 billion. These health benefits include approximately 500 fewer premature deaths
in people with heart or lung disease; 50,000 fewer days of missed work or school; and
1,000 fewer hospital visits due to asthma or heart failure annually. These enforcement
actions also will reduce harmful air emissions, including 308 million pounds of sulfur
2dioxide (SO ), 187 million pounds of nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 11 million pounds of
particulate matter annually.328
The report’s longer exposition of the EPA’s air enforcement efforts
emphasized that “OECA’s focus on priority areas yields substantial benefits
for public health” and identified specific health benefits beyond those listed
by the Assistant Administrator: “[a]bout 1,500 fewer cases of chronic
bronchitis and acute bronchitis”; “[a]bout 1,000 fewer nonfatal heart attacks”;
“[m]ore than 8,000 fewer cases of upper aggravated asthma”; and “[m]ore
than 15,000 few cases of upper and lower respiratory symptoms.”  Such329
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the results of Clean Water Act enforcement more generally in terms of 178 million pounds of pollutants
reduced and $3.6 million invested in pollution control), 15 (describing sewer system improvements in terms
of $3.5 billion in investments and 45 million pounds of pollutants reduce and CAFOs in terms of 15 million
ponds of pollutants reduced and $30 million in pollution controls), 26 (describing enforcement at nine
Amtrak facilities as preventing almost 400,000 pounds of pollutants from entering waterways), 34–35
(summarizing such numbers by program and by type of enforcement activity).
335. Id. See also id. at 5 (tabulating estimated pollutant reduction commitments from FY2003 to
FY2007), 6 (tabulating investments in pollution control and environmental projects over the same years and
qualitative descriptions also applied to specific types of air enforcement
2actions. For example, coal-fired electric utilities “release sulfur dioxide (SO )
and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which cause respiratory problems and contribute
to childhood asthma, acid rain, smog, and haze,” while mobile sources emit
toxic air pollutants like “cancer-causing benzene” and other pollutants “that
are responsible for respiratory illnesses.”  Similarly, agricultural processing330
facilities release oilseed, a hazardous air pollution that “can cause adverse
effects on the central nervous system, the heart, and other organs.”331
In contrast, and again as was the case for the FY2006 report, OECA
rhetorically submerged the public health benefits of enforcement efforts in
other program areas. For example, enforcement actions against CSOs and
SSOs “led to investments of $3.5 billion in pollution controls to remove 45
million pounds of pollutants,” and “[t]hese investments are more than three
times greater than those obtained in FY 2006.”  To be sure, OECA did332
acknowledge that “[w]hen overflows occur, pollutants enter waterways,
causing human health risks such as diseases that can range in severity from
mild gastroenteritis to life-threatening cholera,”  but most of its descriptions333
of the results from CWA enforcement emphasized the poundage of pollutants
reduced and the monetary value of investment in pollution control
equipment.  As for land contamination:334
Superfund enforcement and other remediation agreements committed responsible parties
to invest $688 million last year to clean up contamination and reimburse EPA $314
million for past response and oversight costs. The parties agreed to clean up a record-
setting 79 million cubic yards of contaminated soil, or enough to cover more than 12,000
football fields with 3 feet of dirt. Polluters also agreed to clean up 1.4 billion cubic yards
of contaminated water, which is enough to fill more than 425,000 Olympic-size
swimming pools.335
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341. But see id. at 15 (describing Agrofos Fertilizer’s fish kill), 19 (explaining that “EPA’s criminal
enforcement program addresses all of the environmental statutes and it uses a strategic approach to identify
cases with significant environmental and human health impact, cases which enhance deterrence, and cases
which advance EPA’s enforcement priorities”).
Finally, even though criminal enforcement “[e]mphasize[d] ‘high-impact’
cases that will yield the greatest environmental and human health benefits and
promote significant deterrence,”  OECA tended to emphasize quantitative336
measures of EPA’s enforcement effort—cases initiated, defendants charged,
years of sentences, amount of fines, costs of projects, and pounds of pollution
reduced—rather than qualitative improvements in environmental quality or
public health.337
This contrast in rhetorical presentation is stark and gives the distinct
impression that only CAA programs—along with enforcement efforts in
Indian country  and environmental justice actions —substantially protect338 339
public health. More disturbingly, OECA’s presentation of the results of water-
and land-based enforcement efforts do not even present a clear picture of the
ultimate environmental benefits of those enforcement efforts: Are stream or
meadow ecosystems being restored? Endangered or threatened species
benefitted? Fish kills and beach closures avoided? The public benefits of all
this cleanup are at best only implicit.
9. OECA Enforcement Report for FY2008340
In early December 2008, OECA published its enforcement report for
FY2008. While OECA continued to monetize and describe specifically the
public health benefits of air enforcement actions, it also continued to more
generally avoid reporting qualitative assessments of how its enforcement
actions improved environmental quality  or providing public health341
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investments for storm water and the civil penalties, pounds of pollutants reduced, pollution control
investment, and environmental conservation for a wastewater discharge), 16 (summarizing pollutants
reduced and pollution control investments by program, plus tabulating civil penalties assessed), 18
benefits  in other programs, again favoring quantitative measures of its342
enforcement efforts. Moreover, it pursued this rhetorical disjunction despite
emphasizing that “OECA’s goal is to ensure that the environmental and public
health benefits that are promised by our nation’s environmental laws are
realized.”  For example, Assistant Administrator Nakayama summarized343
that:
In FY 2008, EPA concluded civil and criminal enforcement actions requiring polluters
to spend an estimated $11.8 billion, an agency record, on pollution controls, cleanup and
environmental projects. This exceeds the FY 2007 amount by approximately $800
million. This means that each workday OECA was securing agreements from violators
to invest an estimated $47 million to achieve compliance. The combined total for the last
five years is an estimated $45 billion ($5.5, $11.3, $5.4, $11.0, and $11.8 billion,
respectively)—exceeding EPA’s total annual budget over the same period.
After all the complying actions for FY 2008 cases are completed, EPA estimates that 3.9
billion pounds of pollution will be reduced or removed annually from the environment,
the highest amount since FY 1999. In the last five years EPA’s record for estimated
pollution reductions stood at 1.1 billion pounds for FY 2005. The estimated pollutant
reductions resulting from FY 2008 enforcement actions exceed FY 2005 by almost four
times. The FY 2008 estimate also exceeds the combined results obtained during FY
2004–2007 by nearly 100 million pounds.
Nearly half of this year’s pollution reductions are the result of an enforcement action
taken against American Electric Power, one of the largest environmental settlements of
all time. EPA, along with our partners at the U.S. Department of Justice, and the States
of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maryland, Rhode
Island, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, negotiated this historic settlement
which will save an estimated $32 billion in health costs per year.344
As in the FY2007 report, information regarding pounds of pollutants reduced,
money spent on compliance, and the value of penalties and environmental
projects permeates the FY2008 report.  Perhaps most tellingly, in a section345
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entitled “Delivering Environmental Results,” OECA emphasized that “[i]n FY
2008, EPA’s concluded enforcement actions will reduce pollutant emissions
to air, water and land by an estimated 3.9 billion pounds per year when the
pollution controls and other measures required by these actions are installed
and operational,” that “[t]hese pollution reductions will result from legally
enforceable commitments by violators to invest an estimated $11.8 billion, the
highest amount on record, on installing pollution controls, cleanup and
environmental projects,” and that it achieved these results primarily by
focusing on its enforcement priorities, which reflected “areas of significant
non-compliance with the nation’s environmental laws across the country that
resulted in substantial amounts of illegal pollution.”346
As in FY2007, OECA essentially limited its discussion of the public
health benefits of its FY2008 environmental enforcement to its discussion of
enforcement under the CAA.  The EPA’s ten largest enforcement actions347
against stationary sources yielded $35 billion in health benefits for the nation.
“These health benefits include:”
• Approximately 4,000 avoided premature deaths in people with heart or lung disease;
• Over 2,000 fewer emergency room visits for diseases such as asthma and respiratory
failure;
• About 6,000 fewer cases of chronic bronchitis and acute bronchitis;
• About 4,000 fewer nonfatal heart attacks;
• Over 30,000 fewer cases of upper aggravated asthma;
• Over 50,000 fewer cases of upper and lower respiratory symptoms; and
• Over 200,000 fewer days when people would miss work or school.348
While these specifics are powerful evidence of the public health benefits of
CAA enforcement, this qualitative analysis for the CAA, in the context of
quantitive counting for other pollution statutes, again gives the impression that
public health benefits accrue only (or at least primarily) from reductions in air
pollution, not in other EPA programs.
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10. Enforcement Results for FY2009
As this Article goes to press, the EPA has not yet released its formal
accomplishments report for FY2009. Nevertheless, it has announced its
enforcement and compliance results for that year.  These announcements349
highlight public health benefits from environmental enforcement, but again
privilege the CAA.
On its web site, for example, that EPA announces:
EPA continues to vigorously enforce the nation’s environmental laws. In fiscal year (FY)
2009, the Environmental Protection Agency’s enforcement and compliance program
concluded civil and criminal enforcement actions requiring polluters to invest an
estimated $5.4 billion to reduce pollution, clean up contaminated land and water, achieve
compliance and fund environmentally beneficial projects. Civil and criminal defendants
committed to reduce pollution by approximately 570 million pounds annually once all
required controls are fully implemented.
EPA targets its enforcement actions to address the most important environmental and
public health problems. Approximately 57% of pollution reductions and 71% of
pollution control investments obtained through the Agency’s FY 2009 enforcement
actions focused on water and air pollution priority problems.
EPA’s top Clean Air Act enforcement actions during FY 2009 reduced approximately
230 million pounds of sulfur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter
(PM) per year when all the required pollution controls are in place, resulting in estimated
health benefits of between $4 billion to $9.8 billion.350
Thus, the EPA still explicitly ties its enforcement priorities to public health as
well as environmental problems, but it monetizes public health benefits only
for CAA enforcement.
Importantly, however, in FY2009 EPA began to present its enforcement
results through an interactive map,  recognizing that most quantitative351
measures of its enforcement efforts do not adequately convey the public
importance of those efforts:
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EPA mapped the locations of more than 90 percent of the facilities that were the subject
of enforcement actions last year. EPA did not map the locations of drinking water
treatment plants due to potential security concerns.
For the past 10 years, EPA has described annual enforcement results by focusing
primarily on two measures, the estimated pounds of pollutants reduced and estimated cost
of commitments made by defendants to control or reduce pollution. These measures vary
significantly from year to year and are dependent upon the number of large cases that
settle in a given year.
While these large cases are a vital part of our work to protect public health and improve
compliance, they do not reflect the totality of the annual environmental enforcement
activities, and do not capture the number and variety of enforcement actions taken to help
clean up local communities. The new mapping tool will help increase transparency,
improve access to data, and provide the public with the bigger picture of enforcement
activity occurring in communities around the country.352
Thus, while quantitative enforcement reporting remains important in
FY2009,  the EPA is working to improve communication of qualitative353
public health and environmental benefits to the public.
This impulse is also evident in other EPA reporting summaries for
FY2009. For example, while the CAA remains the focus of public health
benefit summaries, the EPA expanded such reporting in limited ways to
hazardous waste cleanup and CWA enforcement:
EPA’s top Clean Air Act enforcement actions of FY 2009 reduced emissions of
particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, VOCs, and ammonia, resulting in
annual benefits of:
P Between $4.0 to $9.8 billion in avoided health costs
P Between 450 to 1,200 avoided premature deaths in people with heart or lung
disease
P Over 790 fewer emergency room visits or hospital admissions
P About 1,000 fewer cases of chronic bronchitis and acute bronchitis
P About 720 fewer nonfatal heart attacks
P Over 7,700 fewer cases of aggravated asthma
P Over 15,000 fewer cases of upper and lower respiratory symptoms
P Over 58,000 fewer days when people would miss work or school.
• Air Toxics enforcement actions in 76 counties protected the 26 million people living
in those counties
• Hazardous waste enforcement actions protected an estimated 96 thousand people who
live within 500 meters of hazardous waste facilities
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• 23% of EPA CWA enforcement actions reduced pollutants discharged into waters that
states have identified as impaired.354
Similarly, some descriptions of specific enforcement efforts in areas other
than air quality emphasized the public health import of the EPA’s efforts. For
example, with respect to the Standard Mine enforcement action, the EPA
noted that “[t]he contaminants of concern are primarily heavy metals
including manganese, lead, zinc, cadmium, and copper. Contaminated water
from the now abandoned Standard Mine flows into Elk Creek, a major
tributary to Coal Creek, which serves as a source of drinking water to the
residents of Crested Butte.”355
CONCLUSION
This review of the EPA’s enforcement policies over the last decade shows
that the agency does indeed privilege the federal pollution control statutes’
public health goals in certain aspects of environmental enforcement. For
example, since FY2001, the EPA has tended to choose national enforcement
priorities that have fairly strong and obvious connections to public health
protection. Moreover, in its last four enforcement reports, OECA has
emphasized the effectiveness of cleaving to these priorities.  Thus, the EPA356
has effectively emphasized the public health benefits of environmental
regulation through these enforcement priorities.
Similarly, actual or risked public health impacts can influence the type of
enforcement action that the EPA chooses to take. Violations that put the
public health at risk are likely both to prompt the EPA to pursue injunctive
relief and to increase the amount of penalties sought, both of which counsel
for civil rather than administrative enforcement. In cases where the requisite
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intent is present, particularly egregious risks to persons and public health can
also warrant criminal enforcement.357
Such public health emphases in enforcement have also provided OECA
with much rhetorical power in presenting its enforcement achievements to
Congress and the public, especially with respect to enforcement under the
CAA. Perversely, however, until FY2009, OECA retreated from its 2001 and
2002 multi-media (air, water, land) explanations of how EPA enforcement
actions protect and enhance the public health (or improve environmental
quality and function, for that matter) in favor of largely unrevealing
quantitative assessments of its enforcement activities in non-air programs.
Overall, rhetorically, OECA’s FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008
enforcement reports strongly suggest that only CAA enforcement substantially
protects the public health and that the public benefits—health or
environmental—of other pollution control statutes are obscure or limited. This
rhetoric is odds both with the EPA’s national enforcement priorities—almost
all which have had, since FY2005, explicit connections to public health
concerns—and the goals and requirements of the statutes themselves. The
FY2009 expansion of public health impact reporting—however limited—to
hazardous waste and water enforcement, coupled with new measures to
increase the public transparency of the benefits of environmental enforcement,
thus signals a welcome revived commitment on the EPA’s part to emphasizing
these public benefits of environmental enforcement.

